MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



701 



-1 arisen out of the Scripture history ; for we do not pre- 

 Phiioop!ir. t en ,i t belong to that school of philosophy which would 

 keep the mind completely uninfluenced by such consi- 

 derations ; and we h*ve been taught from our infancy 

 to believe that the earth was cursed with sterility on 

 account of nun's transgression ; and t^at the elements 

 and system of nature were henceforth charged with 

 hostility against the li.'- and happiness of man. 



At the same time, these evils serve both as punish- 

 ments and correctives ; their evident design being to 

 obviate the evil tendency of our appetites, passions, and 

 affections; and whatever uneasiness they may cause, 

 man, a* hb nature is now constituted, is undoubtedly 

 happier than he would be without them. 



Ivit we do not pretend wholly to remove the diffi- 

 culties connected with this question, when we endea- 

 vour to show that the outward arrangements of Provi- 

 dence are adapted with infinite wisdom to the present 

 condit-on and circumstance* of man. For the question 

 .-, Mow the condition of man came to be as we now 

 i and why evil and suffering are permitted to 

 i place among the works of a good and merciful 

 \\ will ; -rlnps be fully as near our purpose 

 to tay at once, " Such is the will of Him who orders all 

 things well and wisely." But men are not disposed to 

 .re; and they have anxiously laboured to sepa- 

 rate the existence uf evil from the ordinations of Hea- 

 ven, affirming that though Ciu>\ t iresarr the introduction 

 of evil, yet he neither willed nor appointed it. This, 

 however, will perhaps not appear to many quite satis- 

 factory; for aa every thing depends on the Almighty, 

 it may be aaid that his pracimce, or knowledge of 

 what is to happen, miut have the tame effect a* an ab- 

 solute decree. 



There i* one way of getting rid of thi* difficulty ; 

 but we fear it will not mend the matter much. It i-. 

 affirm tance, that prticienee actually does not 



belong to G<> 1. and that any idea, implying either Pott 

 or /'/ !>e totally inapplicable to a Being who 



v with his presence, with whom a thousand 

 yean are aa one day, and one day as a thoiuand years. 

 I'hn i-. no doubt, true; but if it is available for any 

 thing, it 14 to silence, rather than to satisfy our reason, 

 and to show us our utter incumpetency to OMBprabcad 

 the t -I. It is of no use as an explanation, 



unleM it could be shown th.it the actions of men are 

 altogether independent on God, and that he could nut 

 prevent them from being what they are: but this would 

 be vindicating hit jurtice at the expence of his om- 

 nce, ami exalting his mercy by denying his 

 power. 



We must not suppose tli.it the Almighty has been 

 directed in In- <li terminations or decree* by any thing 

 laauubiing the fate which the ancients represented as 

 liiii'liti^ ;,"!* and men : we must conceive him to be 

 suit of htr. perfectly free in his determinations and his actions ; 

 and, though evil is permitted, we have reason to con- 

 that it could not be prevented, without the ob- 

 struction of a greater good. Hence, the observation of 

 Augustine, quoted with approbation by Thomas Aqui- 

 na* and Ix-ilmitz, Devm prrmiUere qimdam mala fieri, 

 Opfniontof *"** ** i*p*tiatur. The latter author observe-, 

 that every thing whose contrary implies a contradiction 

 nd Kd- has a necessary existence ; but every thing that mifjht 

 * be otherwise than it i, though determined to be what 

 tor tumcient and infallible reasons, is contingent. 

 . !a po*. Ton voit comment nous pouvotnt dire avec 

 plutieurs Philosopher et 1'heologiens celebres, que la 

 substance qui pens* est poru-e a sa resolution pur la re. 

 presentation prevalente du bien cm du inal, et cela err. 



tainement et infaiUiblemenl, mais non pas necessaire- Moral 

 ment : c'est a dire par des raisons qui 1'inclinent sans Pliitosop 

 la neccssiter. C'est pourquoi les fiitnrs contingens, pre- 

 vus et en eux-memes et par leur raisons, demeurent 

 contingens ; et Dieu a etc porte infailliblement par sa 

 sagesse ct par sa bonte a creer le rnonde par sa 

 puissance, et a lui donner la meilleure forme possible ; 

 mais il n'y etoit point porte neceseairement ; et le tout 

 s'est passe sans aucune diminution de sa liberte parfaite 

 et souveraine. Et sans consideration que nous veuons 

 de faire, je ne sais s'll seroit aise de resoudre le noeud 

 Gordien tie la contingence et de la liberte." Remarqucs 

 sitr Ic Livre de fOrig. du Mai. And'with regard to the 

 existence of evil under the administration of a Being, 

 powerful, wise, and good, it is to be observed, that 

 there is a wide difference between causing or appointing 

 evil, and merely permitting it. This subject is illus- 

 trated by Jonathan Edwards by a striking analogy. 

 " There is a vast difference," says he, " between the 

 sun's being the cause of the lightsomeness and warmth 

 of the atmosphere, and brightness of gold and diamonds, 

 by its presence and positive inSuence, and its being the 

 occasion of darkness and frost in the night, by its mo- 

 tion, whereby it descends below the horizon." " If 

 the sun were the proper cause of cold and darkness, it 

 would be the fountain of these things, as it is the foun- 

 tain of light and heat; and then something might be ar- 

 gued from the nature of cold and darkness, to a like- 

 ness of nature in the sun ; and it might be justly infer, 

 red, that the sun itself is dark and cold, aud that his 

 beams are black and frosty. But. from its being the 

 cau>e, no otherwise than by its departure, no such thing 

 can be inferred, but the contrary : it may justly be ar- 

 gued, that the sun is a bright and hot body, if cold and 

 darkness are found to be the consequence of its with- 

 drawment ; and the more constantly and necessarily 

 these effects are connected with, and confined to its ab- 

 sence, the more strongly does it argue the sun to be the 

 fountain of light and heat. So, inasmuch as sin is not 

 the fruit of any positive agency or influence of the 

 Most High, but, on the contrary, arises from the with- 

 holding of his action and energy, and, under certain 

 circumstances, necessarily follows on the want of his 

 influence ; this is no argument that he is sinful, or his 

 operation evil, but, on the contrary, that he and his 

 agency are altogether good and holy, and that he is the 

 fountain of all holiness. It woukl be strange arguing, 

 indeed, because men never commit sin, but only when 

 God leaves them to themselves, and necessarily sin 

 when he does so, and therefore their sin is not from 

 themselves, but from God, and so that God must be a 

 sinful Being ; as strange as it would be to argue, be- 

 i .111-1- it is always dark when the sun is gone, and never 

 dark when the sun is present, that, therefore, all dark- 

 ness is from the MHI, and that his disk and beams must 

 needs l>e black." 



But even the moral evils which are in the world, how. 

 ever destructive they may be to those with whom they 

 originate, are productive of good, on the whole. In a 

 state like tile present, where man has to learn almost 

 every thing by experience, instruction, or example, 

 the aberrations of the wicked, and the obvious conse- 

 quences of their sins, afford a useful lesson, a,nd supply 

 demonstrations of the danger of deviating from the 

 plain path of rectitude as pointed out by the ordina- 

 tions of Heaven. Besides, we receive a clearer proof 

 of the superintending providence of God in overruling 

 the disorderly passions of men, and making them sub- 

 servient to the purposes of his will, than if all went on 

 regularly and smoothly without a single jarring, or dis- 

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