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MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



Moral it is evidently illogical and inconclusive to arpie that 

 'hiiorophy. t jj e sou j mus t f.,u w ith our material bodies. The body 

 "Y""' is corrupted, changed, and disorganized, by the divi- 

 sion or dissolution of its parts. This is the only idea 

 that our senses present to us of death. But it is not 

 even possible to conceive that the mind can be subject- 

 ed to such a process ; for it is not composed of parts : 

 it is indivisible and indiscerptible, and cannot be affect- 

 ed by any of the accidents which alter or derange a 

 material and divisible substance. 



Another argument for the soul's immortality may be 

 drawn from the faculties with which it is endowed. It 

 is evidently possessed of powers capable of indefinite 

 improvement : we can scarcely form an idea of any li- 

 mits which can be set to its advancement. This im- 

 provement of the soul, however, is scarcely begun in 

 the present world : a man has barely time to look about 

 him, and contemplate the attainments to which he may 

 aspire, when he is cut off in the very commencement 

 of his career of improvement, and prevented from ma- 

 king those advances in virtue and knowledge, of which 

 he feels his nature to be susceptible. 



Now, we may reasonably ask, why such extensive 

 capabilities should be given to the soul, if it is to be 

 extinguished before they are evolved ? It is a common 

 observation that God does nothing in vain ; that there 

 is nothing superfluous, unnecessary, or redundant, 

 through all the works of nature ; that every animal has 

 organs and instincts adapted to its necessities and its 

 uses ; and is never furnished with faculties or propen- 

 sities 'for which there is no adequate exercise or enjoy- 

 ment. We may naturally conclude, then, that those 

 faculties in man which enable him to contemplate the 

 divine nature, and to resemble the divine perfections, 

 are intended for a higher sphere of existence, where 

 they will be fully unfolded and fully gratified ; which 

 is by no means the case in the present world. 



Again, from every idea that we can form of God, we 

 are forced to conclude that he must be offended with 

 vice, and pleased with virtue; and, of consequence, 

 that the one will be punished, and the other rewarded. 

 This, however, is evidently not done in the present 

 world ; for here vice often reigns triumphant, whilst 

 virtue is calumniated and oppressed. We may, there- 

 fore, naturally conclude, that there must be a period of 

 retribution, when all these irregularities shall be finally 

 adjusted. 



But, in truth, were God actually to punish and re- 

 ward virtue in the present world, it would not remove 

 one of our doubts and difficulties as to the equity of the 

 divine administration, unless we were possessed of the 

 omniscience of the Sovereign Judge, and knew pre- 

 cisely all the motives by which the actors have been 

 influenced ; for in these alone consists the merit and 

 the demerit of their conduct. As such knowledge as 

 this is wisely denied us in the present world, the season 

 of final retribution is properly deferred till the time 

 when the secrets of every heart shall be made known, 

 and the whole universe made to recognise the justice 

 and wisdom of the divine administration. 



Virtue can- It is indeed said tint virtue is its own reward, and 

 not receive T j ce j tg owr) p un i s h men t even j n t ne present world ; 



ward" n'oV anf * certam ' v ' cannot be denied that the man who 



vice its full violates the eternal laws of providence will find himself 



punishment punished in the very transgrer-sion. But a cautious 



in the i r<- sinner may avoid all these consequences ; he iiiay be 



sent world, filled with envy, malignity, dishonesty, and fv-ery evil 



affection ; his character may be stained with every 



shade and degree of moral turpitude in the sight of 



God, whilst it appears spotless, and unsullied in the Moral 

 eyes of men. Tiiere is no temporal punishment pro- Philosophy. 

 vided for such guilt as this, even conscience does not ' >* ^ 

 necessarily prove n avenger ; on the contrary, the 

 wretch may find a kind of fiend-like enjoyment in 

 the gratification of his unhallowed affections. We grant, 

 indeed, that the virtuous may experience much happi- 

 ness in the approbation of their conscience, even amidst 

 the troubles and calamities of life ; but this is only in 

 consequence of a conviction that they are acting ac- 

 cording to the eternal rules of rectitude which God has 

 established, and that consequently their conduct must 

 be pleasing to him. The wicked, on the other hand, 

 often experience the greatest torture in the compunc 

 tion and remorse of their consciences ; but this arises 

 solely from the fear of future punishment, which their 

 guilty consciences tell them they have deserved. 



Such are some of the arguments which the light of 

 nature furnishes in favours of the soul's immortality ; 

 a doctrine which has had a most extensive reception, 

 and a no less extensive influence in every state of hu- 

 man society. The vulgar who were not misled by 

 philosophical speculations, had distinct views of a state 

 of reward and punishment ; and though their creed 

 was, in many respects, very erroneous, and very ab- 

 surd, we firmly believe that it had more efficacy than 

 all the laws that ever were invented by man, in direct- 

 ing to that line of conduct which was conceived to be 

 agreeable to the will of the gods. 



The question of Liberty and Necessity. 



The question of liberty and necessity has always been The ques- 

 conceived to be intimately connected with morals ; and '">" of Ll - 

 has had a place in almost all systems of moral science. f rt 

 Yet none has been involved in such perplexity ; and * 

 on none do the opinions of writers appear so diametri- 

 cally opposite to each other. We consider this as a 

 sure proof that they do not understand each other's 

 reasoning, or that they affix totally different ideas to 

 the terms in which their propositions are announced ; 

 and whilst they are exhausting their ingenuity in de- 

 molishing the arguments of their adversaries, they are 

 very often only combating the phantoms which their Objections 

 own imagination has raised. The advocates for liberty, to Neccssi- 

 on the one hand, charge the opposite doctrine with '> 

 many tremendous consequences. They represent it as 

 subversive of ail moral agency, as breaking down the 

 fences of virtue, and opening the door to immorality 

 and irreligion. And it must be confessed that Hobbes 

 and others have held the doctrine in such a form as 

 fully to authorize these conclusions. But, on the other to Liberty, 

 hand, Leibnitz and Edwards state the doctrine of ne- 

 cessity in such a way, as to vindicate it from all such 

 charg'es ; and the latter author undertakes to demon- 

 strate, that the opposite scheme infallibly brings along 

 with it all the evil consequences which its advocates 

 have attempted to connect with the doctrine of neces- 

 sity. 



It is evident from this, that there must be some grie. 

 vous misunderstanding on the one side or the other ; 

 for without this, it would be impossible to conceive that 

 men of learning and ingenuity, as the disputants in this 

 controversy generally are, should arrive at such oppo- 

 site conclusions on the same subject. Whether we shall 

 be able to untie this Gordian knot to the satisfaction of 

 our readers, we think is very doubtful. We shall en- 

 deavour, however, to give a fair view of the question, 

 and shall state without reserve our own opinion. 



The advocates for liberty are hard pressed by the ar 



