MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



705 



Mormi 





gument, that the will is influenced by the last determi- 

 . nation of the understanding, or by previous habits, or by 

 that which appears at the time most desirable. If they 

 admit this, the question ii decided ; for that liberty which 

 they reckon essential to moral action it destroyed. This 

 it confessed by Archbishop King*, who brings the mat- 

 ter to a very distressing dilemma; for he says that if the 

 will is influenced by reason it.is not free, and, if it is not 

 thus influenced, it acts irrationally. One would not think 

 it easy to escape from the horns of this dilemma ; but 

 this author attempt* it by a method almost peculiar to 

 himself; for with the exception of his very able com- 

 mentator, we scarcely know any who has adopted it. 

 His scheme is, that " things are not chosen because 

 they are good, but become good because they are cho- 

 sen." 



We would here notice the strange idea that this au- 

 thor, and indeed almost all the advocates for liberty, 

 entertain respecting the nature of human freedom. Ac- 

 cording to their notion, a perfectly wise and good man, 

 who cannot possibly will what is foolish or wicked, is 

 subject to a necessity destructive of virtue and moral 

 responsibility. On the same principle, it might be said 

 that the Supreme Cause cannot be free, because he can- 

 not but do that which is wisest and best. This, as Dr. 

 Clarke observe*, U a necessity, not of nature or of fate, 

 but of fitness and wisdom ; a necessity consistent with 

 the greatest freedom and most perfect choice ; for the 

 only foundation of this necessity is such an unalterable 

 rectitude of will, and perfection of wisdom, as makes it 

 impossible for a wise being to act foolishly. " Though 

 God is a most perfect and free agent, says the same 

 author, yet he cannot but do always what is best and 

 wisest on the whole. The reason is evident ; because 

 perfect wisdom and goodness are as steady and certain 

 principles of action, as neceitiiy itself; and an infinite- 

 ly wise and good Being, endued with the most perfect 

 liberty, can no more choose to act in contradiction to 

 wisdom and goodness, than a necessary agent can act 

 contrary to the necessity by which it is acted; it being 

 u great an absurdity and impossibility in choice, for 

 infnitc wisdom to choose to act unwisely, or infinite 

 goodnrM to choose what is not good, as it would be in 

 nature for absolute necessity to fail of producing its 

 necessary effect." 



. We may apply this subject to human agents in the 



tow tt UM weeds of Mr. Locke. " ' Tis not a fault, but a perfec- 

 tion of our nature, to desire, will, and act, according 

 to the last result of a fair examination. This is so far 

 from being a restraint or diminution of freedom, that 

 it is the very improvement and benefit of it : it is not 

 an abridgment, it is the end and use of our liberty ; 

 and the farther we are removed from such a determi- 

 nation, the nearer we are to misery and slavery. A 

 perfect indifference in the mind, not determinate by 

 its but judgment of the good or evil that is thought to 

 attend its choice, would be so far from being an ad- 

 vantage and excellency of any intellectual nature, that 

 it would be as great an imperfection, as the want of 

 imlifferency to act or not to act, till determined by the 

 will, would be an imperfection on the other side. It 

 U as much a perfection, that desire or the power of 

 preferring should be determined by good, as that the 

 power of acting should be determined by the will ; 

 and the certainer such determination is, the greater 

 the perfection. Nay, were we determined by any 

 thing but the last result of our own minds, judging of 



Mr.UwkVi 



the good or evil of any action, we were not free. The Moral 

 very end of our freedom being, that we might attain PWlesophr. 

 the good we choose; and, therefore, every man is ""V" 

 brought under a necessity, by his constitution as an 

 intelligent being, to be determined in willing, by his 

 own thought and judgment, what is best for him to 

 do ; else he would be under the determination of some 

 other than himself, which is want of liberty. And to 

 deny that a man's will in every determination follows 

 his own judgment, is to say that a man wills and acts 

 for an end he would not have, at the same time that 

 he wills and acts for it For if he prefers it in hia 

 present thoughts before any other, it is plain he then 

 thinks better of it, and would have it before any other; 

 unless he can hsrve, and not have it, will, and not will 

 it, at the same time ; a contradiction too manifest to be 

 admitted. If to break loose from the conduct of rea- 

 son, and to want that restraint of examination and 

 judgment, that keeps us from doing or choosing the 

 worse, be liberty, madmen and fools are the only free 

 men. Yet I think nobody would choose to be mad, 

 for the sake of such liberty, but he that is mad al- 

 ready." 



King gives tip all idea of vindicating the freedom of Objection* 

 the human will, on any other principle than that which *'"' 

 he has adopted, viz. thai things chosen derive their ra- doctrine, 

 lue from the choice of the mind ; and we think it may 

 be fairly concluded, that the cause is lost if it has no 

 better support. He complains that the friends of the 

 opposite doctrine deal in subtleties, and in arguments 

 remote from common feeling and common apprehen. 

 sion. But the charge may with justice be retorted on 

 himself, and it may be affirmed that none has ever ad- 

 vanced such a paradoxical argument on the subject, nor 

 maintained it by such subtle and paradoxical reasoning. 

 It is indeed gratifying to think of the mind's omnipo- 

 tence, and of its superiority over the circumstances of 

 time, place, and accident ; and there can be no doubt, 

 that, with proper regulation, it may be the fabricator 

 of its own happiness. But this is not to be effected 

 by a mere independent fiat of the will, and by the crea- 

 tion of means to secure happiness ; but by a judicious 

 application and proper use of those circumstances which 

 are presented in the arrangements of Providence. Be- 

 fore the mind can have that independence on circum- 

 stances which this author assigns to it, it would require 

 to be not only omnipotent, but omniscient. It must 

 either be omnipotent to model events by a simple voli. 

 tion, as the Almighty did, when he called all things 

 into existence ; or it must be omniscient, that its voli- 

 tions may not interfere with the established order of 

 nature : but the author claims neither of these attri- 

 butes for it, when he asserts its independence on na- 

 ture, judgment, association, and reasoning. All that 

 he claims for it is, that it should be able to discern the 

 things which are possible from those which are impos- 

 sible, and thus provided, it has its happiness completely 

 in its own power. " That person must be happy," 

 says he, " who can always please himself; but this 

 agent can evidently do so. For since things are sup- 

 posed to please him, not by any necessity of nature, 

 but by mere election, and there is nothing which can 

 compel him to choose this rather than another ; it is 

 plain that the agent endowed with this power may al- 

 ways choose such things as it can enjoy, and refuse, 

 that is, not desire or not choose those things which are 

 impossible to be had. And from hence it appears of 



Origin of EriL 



VOL. ZIT. PART II. 



