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MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



Moral how great importance it is, whether that whereby 



Philosophy, things become agreeable to the appetite, be established 



^^ v "^" / by nature, or effected by the agent himself. For if 



good and evil proceed from nature, and be inherent in 



objects, so as to render them agreeable or disagreeable 



antecedent to the election, the happiness of this agent 



will always depend upon them ; and unless the whole 



series of things be so ordered that nothing can happen 



contrary to his appetites, he must fall short of hap- 



piness." 



Now, though we certainly should be sony to coun- 

 tenance the doctrine that a man's happiness is entirely 

 at the mercy of external circumstances ; (for there are 

 many rational considerations which tend to diminish 

 the influence which adverse circumstances would other- 

 wise exert over our happiness;) yet we affirm, with 

 perfect confidence, that there are pains, trials, and 

 disappointments, which must produce unhappiness, un- 

 less they are counteracted by reason, hope, or religion. 

 According to the doctrine which we are combating, a 

 man when placed on the rack ought not to be unhap- 

 py ; for the mind is altogether independent on such 

 circumstances. But certainly there is no man whose 

 feelings are not paralyzed by disease, but must feel 

 pain in such circumstances ; and if pain be not an evil, 

 then the ingenious author should have given a different 

 form to his very important, though in many respects 

 very eccentric, Essay on the Origin and Tendency of 

 Evil ; and should have endeavoured to show that no 

 such thing as evil exists in the universe. 



This holds undoubtedly true with regard to physical 

 evil ; for if there be nothing in external circumstances 

 which has a direct tendency to affect our happiness, 

 then it is idle to talk, as the author has done at so great 

 length in the first part of his book, of the physical evils 

 of hunger, disease, death, &c. And Leibnitz has 

 shewn no less clearly that if the mind choose without 

 a motive, there can be no moral evil : for moral evil 

 consists in a wrong choice, and if there be nothing to 

 direct the choice, how can it be wrong ? " Dans le fond, 

 bien loin que ce soit montrer la source du mal moral, 

 c'est vouloir qu'il n'y en ait aucune. Car si la volonte 

 se determine sans qu'il y ait rien, ni dans la personne 

 que choisit, ni dans I'objet qui est choisi, qui puisse 

 porter au choix, il n'y aura aucune cause, ni raison de 

 cette election : et comme le mal moral consiste dans le 

 mauvais choix, c'est avouer que le mal moral n'a point 

 de source du tout. Ainsi>dans les regies de la bonne 

 metaphysique, il faudroit qu'il n'y ent point de mal mo- 

 ral dans la nature ; et aussi par la meme raison, il n'y 

 Suiroit point de bien moral non plus, et toute la moralite 

 seroit detruite." Remarques sur la Livre de I'Origine 

 du Mal. 



flume's Hume has observed, and there is undoubtedly truth 



opinion. ' n * ne observation, that we can trace a general course 

 of human conduct almost with as much certainty as we 

 can trace a general course of nature ; that is, we may 

 pronounce that men will act in a certain way in given 

 circumstances with as much confidence as that trees 

 will grow in a given situation : and he justly considers 

 this determination which the conduct receives from 

 circumstances as subversive of that liberty for which 

 many contend. Yet unless we can remove this influ- 

 ence of motives, that indifference which is reckoned 

 essential to liberty is completely destroyed. And how 

 is it possible to remove this influence ? It is directly 

 contrary to the whole scheme of our philosophy to sup- 

 pose it possible ; for we have assumed it as an unques- 

 tionable principle that the general course of nature in- 



fluences both our moral and intellectual associations : -Moral 

 that with regard to intellectual attainments the mind Philosophy, 

 does little more than methodize the facts, and treasure x ^~<~*"* / 

 up the relations presented in the course of nature; and 7 he ml 

 the whole of this article has been conducted on the sup- "fl u "^cei 

 position that our volitions are influenced with infallible by motives, 

 certainty, by the circumstances of our nature, and the 

 visible arrangements of providence. The beautiful or- 

 der which we observe among the works of God is in- 

 tended to facilitate the acquisition of knowledge, and 

 render the path to the temple of science attractive and 

 delightful ; and it is equally intended to influence our 

 volitions and our moral perceptions ; for it would be a 

 most extraordinary inconsistency to affirm that God has 

 formed arrangements for human happiness, and yet 

 that men act at random, without any regard to the ma- 

 nifest will of heaven. 



The advocates for liberty contend that the scheme of The objec- 

 necessity renders means, exhortations, promises, and tions to the 

 threatenings altogether unavailing ; without stopping '<* ci ne of 

 to obviate this, at present, we would merely observe 

 that their own plan must produce this effect in a ten- t orted. 

 fold degree, for it lies at the foundation of their scheme, 

 that motives do not influence, for if they did, there 

 would be an end of liberty ; and if motives do not in- 

 fluence, what is the use of exhortations, promises, or 

 threatenings. 



But will any man, whose ideas are unsophisticated 

 by a philosophical or theological system, pretend to say 

 that the mind is not influenced by instinct, education, 

 association, habit, passion, prejudice, &c. &c. ? And 

 if it be thus influenced, there is an end of indifference 

 of choice, and with it of liberty. Law, in his commen- 

 tary on King's Essay, supports the principle of indif- 

 ference by the following reasoning. " Let a thing L aw > 4 opi 

 appear never so pleasant and agreeable, never so rea- n j on . 

 sonable, fit, and eligible to us, yet there is still a natu- 

 ral possibility for us to will the contrary, and conse- 

 quently the bare power of willing is in itself indifferent 

 to either side.'' There is a fallacy here. In percep- 

 tion, the mind is almost wholly passive, and simply 

 receives the impressions made upon it through the 

 medium of the senses ; in volition it is wholly active. 

 Volition does not, like perception, impart any feeling 

 to the mind ; it is merely the organ or instrument, by 

 means of which the mind manifests its determinations ; 

 and the will never can be indifferent when it is in ac- 

 tion; when it is not in action, it is in nonentity. And 

 with regard to what this author says, that there is a 

 natural possibility for the mind to form a choice, in 

 opposition to every perceived advantage, and every 

 preponderating circumstance, the fact is admitted by 

 every enlightened necessitarian, and he only wishes 

 this author, and all who favour his sentiments, to keep 

 in mind the distinction between physical and moral 

 impossibility. These are generally, perhaps indus- 

 triously, confounded by the advocates for liberty, with 

 a view to bring odium on the opposite doctrine ; and 

 they represent the scheme of necessity as resembling a 

 tyrant who should bind a man to the ground with 

 fetters, and then punish him because he does not, in 

 these circumstances, obey the command, to rise and 

 walk. 



There cannot be a grosser misrepresentation of the 

 doctrine. In the supposed case the mind is free, but 

 the body is subject to physical restraints, which pre- 

 vent volition from issuing in action. But in all moral 

 delinquencies, the mind is indisposed or enslaved ; and 

 the inability to act proceeds only from its own want of 

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