MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



707 



Moral 

 Philosophy, 



The mini 

 jrtd not 

 by phyii- 

 emt but mo- 

 ral 

 T- 



inclination. No restraint whatever is laid on the 

 mind ; it goes wrong, not in consequence of any per 

 ceived constraint, but merely by yielding to the bias 

 of its own inclinations. However strong any tempta- 

 tion may be, no man can say that it is absolutely irre- 

 sistible ; were it so, it would amount to physical im- 

 posttbilily, and would exempt from all blame, and 

 from all moral responsibility. But the man who yields 

 to temptation is only subject to a moral inability, in- 

 duced by bad habits, which he has no inclination to 

 resist. In short, he mills to go wrong, and with his 

 own full and perfect consent runs headlong into vice 

 or folly. Physical restraint is always palpable ; moral 

 restraint cannot be so : for the evil rests in the will 

 itself, or, to speak more properly, in the mind which 

 actuates the will ; and it is not sensible either of re- 

 striction or constraint whilst it is following the de- 

 cided bent of its inclinations. 



Would it not, then, be in the highest degree absurd 

 for any man to complain that his liberty is impaired, 

 when he is both Killing and acting as he pleases. And 

 this species of liberty, and it is the only one of which 

 we have any conception, is left entire by the advo- 

 cates for necessity. But the liberty of indifference so 

 much contended for is incomprehensible. If it con- 

 sist in acting without motives, there can be no more 

 merit or demerit in the actions than if they proceeded 

 from blind fate, or accident; or if it consist in the 

 power of acting contrary to motives, it cannot surely 

 be thought a very enviable prerogative to have the pri- 

 vilege of acting in opposition to reason. 



That we are influenced by motives is certain: the 

 person who despises them is not entitled to the appel- 

 lation of a rational being ; and that God has intended 

 that we should be influenced in a particular way, is no 

 less certain ; for our instincts, appetites, and passions 

 have distinct and definite objects, to which they are 

 adapted ; and the whole course of nature and provi- 

 dence co-operates with them in directing our conduct 

 to particular ends. So far, then, we may say without 

 hesitation, that the liberty of indifference is destroyed 

 by the decree of heaven ; and that God himself, by the 

 arrangement* of his providence, has controlled the 

 volition* and the conduct of men. 



Shall we, then, ascribe to God the sins of men, and 

 the various aberrations of human conduct ? This con- 

 sequence would be unavoidable were men swayed !>y 

 a physical necessity, and did their reason tell them that 

 it is abtoiulely impossible to resist the suggestions to 

 evil. But the case is directly the reverse. Instead of 

 being constrained to do wrong, by a phyiical necessity, 

 it is quite apparent that God has done every thing, as 

 far as is consistent with die moral responsibility of 

 man, to cast the balance on the other side, and to con- 

 strain human beings to walk in the paths of virtue. 

 The miserable consequences of transgression, con- 

 science, reason, sympathy, together with every original, 

 or accessary feeling of our nature, concur in lending 

 their influence to strengthen the obligations of moral 

 duty. They in fact, do all but abtoiulely compel us, 

 to make us virtuous and happy. And so far from 

 feeling ourselves, in any instance, constrained to do 

 evil, the compunctions of conscience are sharpened 

 by the conviction that we have acted in opposition to 

 the most obvious inducements to virtue. Whatever 

 necessity, then, there is arising out of the appointments 

 of heaven, it is all on the side of virtue ; and the self- 

 condemnation of the offender arises from the conscious- 

 ness of having resisted it. Every thing presented in 

 the economy of the Divine government is either posi. 



e tively good, or capable of being turned to good. Riches, Mora! 



- power, and honours are designed by heaven to be Philosophy, 

 the rewards of industry, bravery, or virtue : and no '"""Y"""' 

 man can say that God has misled him, if he aspires 

 to the reward by means which are not consecrated by 

 the appointment of heaven ; and he has no reason to 

 complain, if he finds misery and disgrace, instead of 

 the pleasures which he anticipates. He cannot say 

 that he mistook the means ; it is evident that he un- 

 derstood them perfectly by exhibiting the semblance 

 of those virtues which God delights to honour : but 

 he expects to reach the end by a shorter way than that 

 which is prescribed by the course of Providence ; and 

 he reaps misery as the reward of his furtive attempt to 

 elude the decrees of heaven. 



No man can say that he is constrained to do evil, by 

 the circumstances in which he is placed : for, as it has 

 been said, every thing has two handles, and according 

 as it is employed, may be the means of good, or the 

 instrument of evil. A man's virtue and happiness are 

 ruined, we shall suppose, in certain circumstances ; 

 and it is common for him to say, and for the world to 

 believe him, that had he not been placed in such cir- 

 cumstances, he, would have been happy and good. 

 But it is not his circumstances, nor consequently the 

 appointments of heaven "which he ought to blame ; for 

 he may see thousands both virtuous and happy in the 

 same circumstances in which he ceased to be either. 



. Let no man, then, blame necessity for his sins. He 

 is almost constrained to be virtuous : if the constraint 

 were complete, he could not be a moral agent, nor the 

 same being that he now is. 



We readily admit that there are many things in the 

 economy of the Divine administration which it is quite 

 impossible for finite understandings to comprehend; 

 and to no subject is this observation more applicable 

 than to the one we are now considering. For we 

 admit most readily, that could we even demon- 

 strate the view of the subject we have adopted, and 

 which we think might be brought as near to demon, 

 stration as any point in morals or religion can be, 

 yet even then difficulties would not be wholly re. 

 moved : nor will we presume to say that we can satis- 

 factorily explain all the ways of God on our plan. We 

 believe the same admission will be made by every can- 

 did disputant on the other side ; and the question comes 

 to be, which scheme presents fewest difficulties, and 

 solves the greatest number of doubts. The doctrine of 

 necessity is by no means the most popular, but we are 

 fully convinced that it is by far the most philosophical, 

 and that its antagonist doctrine cannot stand before 

 it in point of argument. The objections to necessity 

 are all of a popular cast; and in removing them it 

 will generally appear that we demolish the opposite 

 doctrine. 



If the advocates for liberty say that it consists in a 

 man's nilling tvhat he pleases; and this is their common 

 language, no necessitarian can have any dispute with 

 them on this point : the proposition is intuitively true, 

 or rather it is a truism for a man never can will any 

 thing but what he pleases, unless it were possible for 

 him to will and not to will the same thing at the same 

 time. Whatever a man wills must, at the moment, 

 please him, or he must consider it most eligible at the 

 time in fact, the expression is tantamount to saying 

 that a man choose* what he chooset. Whatever volition 

 the mind forms must be consistent with its choice, for 

 choice and volition are the same thing: they imply the de- 

 termination or election which the mind has formed, and, 

 therefore, whenever volition is exerted, liberty is at an 



