708 



MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



Moral 



Philoiophr. 



Objeetiona 

 applicable 

 10 both doc- 

 trinet. 



Objections 

 to the 

 scheme of 



necessity 

 reiBOTed. 



end. The mind has already received its impulse it la 

 already in action, and the quiescence, and indifference, 

 supposed to be essential to liberty, have completely va- 

 nished. 



The proper question then, is, What is it that induces 

 the mind to will ? And we think it ought to be admit- 

 ted as an axiom, that if it is swayed by any thing exter- 

 nal to it, and independent of it, or even if it is swayed 

 by any thing essential to its own nature, in neither of 

 these views can it be said to be free, in the sense in 

 which freedom is usually understood, as applied to the 

 human mind. Indeed, it seems to be a most unreason- 

 able freedom that is contended for ; it must arise with- 

 out a cause from the scl /.determining power of the 

 mind. Now, a self-determining power cannot be in- 

 fluenced by any thing, otherwise it is not self-deter, 

 mined ; and if it is not influenced by any thing, then 

 it is a power existing without a cause, of which we can 

 have no conception except in the case of the supreme 

 being. 



Considering the subject speculativcly, one might 

 perhaps be at a loss to determine which of the two 

 schemes is most likely to be abused; for we think it 

 should equally exempt man from responsibility to 

 suppose that he has insufficient motives to influence his 

 conduct, or that he is bound by absolute irresistible ne- 

 cessity. If the author of our nature has not given us 

 sufficient inducements to rectitude of conduct, or, in 

 other words, if he has not presented motives sufficient- 

 ly powerful to influence our will, we cannot well see 

 how we should be answerable for the want of proper 

 volitions ; if, on the other hand, our wills are absolutely 

 controlled, there could be no such things as virtue or 

 vice in the world. 



As we have ventured to take a side in this very dif- 

 ficult question, we shall rest satisfied with vindicating 

 our peculiar views from the objections which have fre- 

 quently been urged against them. And, first, it is said 

 that necessity is altogether inconsistent either with 

 praise or with blame. Physical necessity, or coercion, 

 is undoubtedly inconsistent with praise or blame. But 

 this is not the case with moral necesfUy, otherwise we 

 could not ascribe praise and glory to the Most High, 

 who undoubtedly acts under a moral necessity, for it is 

 impossible for him to do evil ; not that he wants the 

 power to do so, but because it is impossible for a being 

 infinitely wise and good, ever to have an inclination to 

 do evil ; and, according as a man advances in wisdom 

 and goodness, he comes so much nearer to a moral ne- 

 cessity of doing what is right, which, instead of being 

 a defect, constitutes the perfection of his nature. Ha- 

 bits and prepossessions in favour of virtue, which un- 

 doubtedly destroy the equilibrium of indifference, and 

 consequently impair or destroy the freedom of the will, 

 so far from lessening our ideas of the worth of the agent, 

 increase them in the highest degree ; and where we see 

 a fixed and determined bias to virtuous actions, there 

 we place our highest veneration and esteem. On the 

 other hand, a man who is habitually vicious, and so 

 strongly biassed, and inclined to evil as to be incapa- 

 ble of virtuous exertion, is always viewed with addi- 

 tional abhorrence, instead of being considered as excu- 

 sed by the moral inability under which he labours. 

 Moral inability, then, is never considered as any excuse 

 for wickedness, and the nearer it approaches to moral 

 impossibility, the character is considered as so much 

 the more infamous. 



The argument may be carried farther still. " If it Moral 

 be supposed that good or evil dispositions are implant- Philosophy. 

 ed in the hearts of men by nature itself, yet it is not v " '^ "*' 

 commonly supposed that men are worthy of no praise 

 or dispraise for such dispositions ; although what is na- 

 tural, is undoubtedly necessary, nature being prior to 

 all acts of the will whatever. Thus, for instance, if a 

 man appears to be of a very haughty or malicious dis- 

 position, and is supposed to be so by his natural tem- 

 per, it is no vulgar notion, no dictate of the common 

 sense and apprehension of men, that such dispositions 

 are no vices or moral evils, or that such persons are 

 not worthy of disesteem, or odium, or dishonour, or 

 that the proud or malicious acts which flow from such 

 natural dispositions, are worthy of no resentment. Yea, 

 such vile natural dispositions, and the strength of them, 

 will commonly be mentioned rather as an aggravation 

 of the wicked acts that come from such a fountain, 

 than an extenuation of them. Its being natural for 

 men to act thus, is often observed by men in the height 

 of their indignation ; they will say, " It is his very na- 

 ture ; he is of a vile natural temper ; it is as natural to 

 him to act so, as it is to breathe ; he cannot help ser- 

 ving the devil." But it is not thus with regard to hurt- 

 ful, mischievous things, that any are the subjects or oc- 

 casions of by natural necessity, against their inclina- 

 tions. In such a case, the necessity, by the common 

 voice of mankind, will be spoken of as a full excuse. 

 Thus, it is very plain, that common sense makes a vast 

 difference between these two kinds of necessity, as to 

 the judgment it makes of their influence on the moral 

 quality and desert of men's actions *." 



In the second place, it is said that the scheme of ne- 

 cessity is inconsistent with the use of means, and that 

 if virtue or vice come to pass by necessity, it must be 

 useless to employ any means to obtain the one or avoid 

 the other. This is a very groundless objection, and 

 may, with great advantage, be retorted on the opposite 

 scheme. The whole scheme of necessity proceeds on 

 the idea that there is a necessary connection between 

 means and ends, antecedents and consequents. " Ita- 

 que tantum abest, ut pwedeterminatio seu praedisposi- 

 tio ex causis mecessitutem inducat contrariam contin. 

 genti vel libertati aut moralitati ; ut potius in hoc ipso 

 distinguatur fatum Mahometanum a Christiano, absur- 

 dum a rationali ; quod Turcoe causas non curant ; Chris- 

 tiani vero et quicuhque sapiunt, effectum ex causa de- 

 ducunt. Turcse scilicet, ut fama est, (quanquam non 

 on i nes sic desipere putem,) frustra pestem et alia mala 

 evitari arbitrantur ; idque eo praetextu quod futura vel 

 decreta eventura sint, quicquid agas aut non agas, quod 

 falsum est : cum ratio dictet eum qui certo peste mori- 

 turus est, etiam certissime causas pestis non esse evitatu- 

 rum. Nempe, ut recte Germanico proverbio dicitur, 

 mors vult habere causam." Leibnitz. 



It is, then, evidently inconsistent to object to the ne- 

 cessitarian that his scheme renders means unavailing, 

 when he holds that there is a necessary connection be- 

 tween means and ends, motives and action : that when 

 certain means are employed, certain ends will follow ; 

 and that certain motives will as certainly lead to parti. 

 cular actions. With much greater justice may it be 

 said that the opposite scheme supersedes the use of 

 means ; for if there be no fixed and established connec- 

 tion between means and ends ; and the advocates for li- 

 berty are bound to maintain that there is not, for on 

 any other supposition, their scheme falls to the ground ; 



Edwardi on Free Will. 



