CHAP. II COMTE'S LIFE AND TEACHING 2 5 



marks out for itself a new field of scientific achieve- 

 ment by detecting new uniformities. Before Comte, 

 it is urged, there was no science of society. Comte 

 learned from biology to regard society as an organ- 

 ism, profoundly related to its environment. But that 

 did not establish a science of sociology. Two lumi- 

 nous generalisations did so the Law of the Three 

 Stages, and the Hierarchy of the Sciences. This 

 illustrates to us the intricate arrangement of material 

 characteristic of Comte's redundant method. The 

 Hierarchy of the Sciences includes sociology ; but 

 again, the hierarchy is revealed to mankind by soci- 

 ology ; and, once more, the hierarchy constitutes one- 

 half the title-deeds of sociology, justifying its claim 

 to be ranked with the sciences. 



It is a somewhat remarkable development of phe- 

 nomenalism, this arrangement of sciences, not merely 

 in sequence but in a rising scale. It recalls to mind 

 the great Idealist systems of Germany, so like, and 

 so unlike, Comte's philosophy. One is not surprised 

 to find Spencer protesting against the ladder of know- 

 ledge, protesting that the relation between different 

 sciences is not one of superiority and subordination, 

 but one of equal reciprocity, each borrowing from 

 each, each lending to the other. Still, if only be- 

 cause, as Carlyle said, " speech is linear though char- 

 acter is solid," still, it is necessary to take sciences 

 one at a time, first one, then another; the synthetic 

 philosophy itself has a beginning, a middle, and an 

 end. And probably Comte's view has better justi- 

 fication than Spencer's, though there is a measure of 

 truth in each. It is true that borrowing and lending 

 go on between different sciences, backwards and for- 



