CHAP, iv THE APPEAL TO HISTORY 39 



doctrine, the history of theological beliefs. If we 

 treat these in the light of the comparative method 

 they will no longer be meaningless, but meaningful ; 

 we may even discover that " God is not only reveal- 

 ing Himself to His creatures, but also realising Him- 

 self to Himself " in history. 



There is a great deal that is Comtist in this pro- 

 gramme. To " abandon the search for essences and 

 look only to the operation of forces " is thoroughly 

 Comtist in spirit, though even " forces " is too meta- 

 physical a term for Comte's taste ; he would write 

 " sequences." The result contemplated, no doubt, is 

 anything but Comtist; but how immense the gulf 

 between the method recommended and the results 

 desired ! Either our Theistic beliefs are valid and 

 defensible ; but, if so, there are other fields of know- 

 ledge besides that cultivated by phenomenal science, 

 and other methods of study for metempirical and 

 metaphysical subjects. Or else Theism is merely a 

 human delusion ; but, if so, historical science can do 

 nothing to galvanise it into fresh life. The sum of 

 the longest series of cyphers is still zero. In one 

 thing Dr. Hatch is right. Our age is pre-eminently 

 an age of historical study. Very likely our age does 

 better work in dealing with the history of beliefs, 

 theological or other, than in dealing directly with the 

 problem of their justification. Nay, our age may 

 even make its best contributions to metaphysics or 

 theology at second hand in the regions of history. 

 But, if so, that is the weakness of our age, not its 

 strength. And, in any case, profitable treatment of 

 the history of such opinions implies a belief that they 

 deal with facts, not hallucinations. Few of us, 



