50 FROM COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PARTI 



and seeking their good. It is further assumed that 

 the division of motives into these two classes is exact 

 and exhaustive. The two classes in question nowhere 

 overlap, and there is no third class of motives. Every 

 action must be done with a view either to our own 

 good or to the good of another, or some others, or all 

 others. A further assumption is noteworthy, both 

 psychologically and ethically. It is assumed that we 

 are able, if we like, to encourage one class of motives 

 and multiply the actions which proceed from it, to 

 discourage the other class of motives, and to weed 

 out or gradually exterminate the actions to which 

 it gives rise. And, finally, there is the ethical as- 

 sumption, that egoistic actions are bad en masse y and 

 altruistic actions ethically good, so that plainly we 

 ought to encourage altruism, and do our best to put 

 down egoism. 



Psychologically, this doctrine involves a notable 

 break with the phenomenalist ethics of the past. 

 Those systems had almost all been established upon 

 psychological hedonism, on the assertion that man 

 necessarily seeks his own pleasure, and cannot possi- 

 bly, in any action, seek for any other end besides his 

 own pleasure. Man, it was conceived, may be mis- 

 informed as to the best means of securing the given 

 end, and therefore there is still room for ethical 

 science as a body of prudential maxims ; it is still 

 possible to say to man, hopelessly and incurably 

 selfish as he is, " you ought " to do this or that ; 

 although upon such a view "you ought" simply 

 means, This will give you the greatest happiness in 

 the long run. Or hedonism might make room for 

 ethics (of a sort) in a different fashion. The moral 



