CHAP, v THE DOCTRINE OF ALTRUISM 51 



fellowship of human society might be regarded as a 

 mutual insurance office, in which every one surren- 

 dered small fragments of present happiness in return 

 for a guarantee against great contingent unhappiness 

 in the future. Or by a sort of generous confusion 

 the inference might be urged on men that, as each 

 wants his own happiness, we must all labour for the 

 happiness of all. But the psychological background 

 of these various pieces of special pleading was the 

 assertion that, first and last, each man seeks, and 

 must seek, his own pleasure. The assertion can at 

 times be made to appear almost self-evident, though 

 a few minutes' handling by a skilled cross-examiner l 

 will make it look very foolish indeed. 



From that psychology to Comte's psychology, from 

 old-fashioned phenomenalism to new-fashioned posi- 

 tivism, is a somewhat startling change. Shall we not 

 welcome it as a change in the right direction ? Cer- 

 tainly a less libellous account of human nature is given 

 when we are told that it is composed of a group of 

 selfish and a group of unselfish motives, than when 

 the old view is reiterated, according to which human 

 nature is root and branch, first and last, by eternal 

 necessity, selfish and only selfish. But we must still 

 inquire whether Comte's amended statement will pass 

 muster scientifically, and, in the first place, psycho- 

 logically. Now, Comte has no belief in a science of 

 psychology. Psychology ought either to fall back 

 upon physiology and phrenology, or to merge itself 

 in sociology. Taken by itself, Comte regards it as 

 a pseudo-science. But the neglected beauty has a 

 capital opportunity for punishing the erring swain 



1 Cf. Prof. Sorley's Ethics of Naturalism, pp. 23, 24. 



