CHAP.V THE DOCTRINE OF ALTRUISM 53 



Stephen in Liberty, E quality > Fraternity}- Justice 

 Stephen, like his brother Mr. Leslie Stephen, is a 

 very severe critic of the weakness of Comte. He 

 protests especially against a further assumption which 

 we noticed in passing, the assumption that it is pos- 

 sible, by careful effort, to readjust the balance of 

 egoism and altruism in human nature. According to 

 Stephen, such a change lies as far beyond our power 

 as a change in gravitation or magnetism, or any of 

 the forces of nature. Sir Fitzjames Stephen does 

 not (here at least) pin his faith to the old selfish 

 psychology of hedonism. Allowing the assumption 

 to pass, that there are a certain number of unselfish 

 promptings in the nature of mankind, or of any given 

 individual, he assumes that (like the elect under the 

 scheme of Calvinism) they can neither be increased 

 nor diminished in number. The criticism, advanced 

 as it is by a determinist, is a very awkward criticism 

 for his fellow-determinists to meet. Speaking as an 

 impenitent freewiller, one admires this pretty quarrel 

 between the forces of the enemy. Stephen appears 

 to be the more logical or consistent determinist, while 

 he is certainly the more impracticable and the more 

 hopeless guide of human conduct. Put in so naked 

 and outrageous a shape, determinism must repel all 

 who love goodness better than they love paradox. 

 Comte's determinism is disguised or kept in the back- 

 ground. He points out that human agency can do 

 absolutely nothing to modify astronomical laws, but 

 that, as we ascend the scale of the sciences, we see 

 physical and chemical forces yielding more and more 

 to human manipulation, until finally, arrived at soci- 



1 p. no. 



