54 FROM COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PARTI 



ology, we may well expect " the human providence " 

 to prove itself nearly omnipotent. Stripped of its 

 Comtist language, all this is true, but it is a truth 

 incompatible with thoroughgoing phenomenalism. 

 Just because man can modify nature, he can more 

 profoundly modify himself. Just because he is not 

 a passive stage, upon which the feelings fight out 

 their battle and settle his destiny for him; just be- 

 cause " man is man, and master of his fate," he puts 

 his mark upon the world in which he lives, and makes 

 it his world. 



We may now leave the psychological aspects of 

 the doctrine of altruism, and consider its ethical 

 aspects. It has been argued that the sharp contrast 

 between egoistic and altruistic actions or motives is 

 vicious psychology ; and while we have agreed with 

 Comte against Stephen that the forces of human 

 nature are capable of being profoundly modified, we 

 were sceptical as to the possibility of harmonising 

 this fact with the principles of determinism. It re- 

 mains to discuss the ethical significance and trust- 

 worthiness of the altruistic ideal. 



Its significance in Comte's system is plain enough. 

 It furnishes him with a fresh definition of virtue, as 

 the appeal to biology furnished him with a fresh 

 definition of duty. Less authoritative than the doc- 

 trine of the social organism, the doctrine of altruism 

 appeals to man's moral nature from a different side. 

 To live for self is ala-^pov ; to live for others is /ca\bv 

 /cayaQov. Thus there is a special appeal to motive in 

 this new definition. Perhaps, however, it is best 

 understood as a deliberate rejection of duty to God 

 or to any transcendent standard of worth. Virtue 



