86 FROM COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PART n 



in evolution so far as we are to identify dissolution 

 with death. 



There is, however, a further sense in which dissolu- 

 tion may be regarded as the opposite of evolution 

 if it come as a great cosmic catastrophe, bringing to 

 an end (e.g.) the adjustment which has kept the solar 

 system in equilibrium during untold ages. Of course 

 such a crash on such a scale must tell not merely 

 upon planetary evolution, but upon any organic or 

 superorganic evolution, of which the planets in ques- 

 tion had been the scene. From this point of view any 

 disastrous tempest, or earthquake, or volcanic eruption 

 may be regarded as a sample of dissolution. The 

 larger occurrence of similar forms of dissolution Mr. 

 Spencer seems to keep in reserve in order to account 

 for the end of all things phenomenal. Considering 

 the various applications of the term, may we not say 

 that dissolution differs from evolution, not merely in 

 tendency or direction, but also in rate of speed ? 

 That the one is slow and gradual, the other abrupt 

 and cataclysmic ? This is a fresh reason for declin- 

 ing to admit that the two terms are of equal impor- 

 tance in Mr. Spencer's thinking. 



Passing next to speak of balance or equilibrium, we 

 notice that, in Mr. Spencer's system, balance is not 

 mainly contemplated as a phenomenon of experience, 

 occurring in a relative sense, or up to a limited ex- 

 tent, and accompanying the processes of evolution. 

 Mr. Spencer, of course, is fully aware that life, e.g., is 

 a " moving equilibrium." But beyond that truth of 

 experience there presses on his mind a supposed 

 truth of theory, a doctrine of equilibrium, in which 

 balance is strongly contrasted with evolutionary pro- 



