88 FROM COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PART il 



not less bold when he prints a programme for all pos- 

 sible universes! And all this is in the name of 

 science the old and sober science of mathematics. 

 Spencer assumes a definitely limited stock of matter, 

 a definitely limited stock of force, or, as he prefers to 

 say, of motion ; and he alleges that every universe, 

 constituted of these materials, must continuously be- 

 come more and more complex, until it reaches a bal- 

 ance and ultimately is wrecked by an impulse from 

 without. If this is a scientific certainty, so be it. 

 Yet, without attempting to control Mr. Spencer's use 

 of science, one may express surprise at two or three 

 features in the scheme. First, there is the perplex- 

 ing doctrine of the instability of the homogeneous. 

 It would have been so much simpler for nature to 

 remain what it was than to work out a position of 

 balance by more than aeonian evolution, only to re- 

 turn once again to homogeneity and instability. So 

 far, the doctrine seems to be this : evolution is neces- 

 sarily originated because of the very nature of matter 

 and force. Secondly, one may express surprise that 

 the forces from without should be assumed to act only 

 at the very beginning of all things, or at the very end 

 of all things. If they can tear up a worn-out uni- 

 verse, are they not likely to tear up the majority of 

 universes before they have so much as half run their 

 course ? Their interference may be orderly enough ; 

 it may only result in a richer capitalising of the busi- 

 ness ; but assuredly if such things happen, evolution 

 will need to start de novo. Thirdly, the grounds for 

 the theory of equilibrium are not manifest to the 

 plain reader. If matter and force can and must initi- 

 ate a process of growing complexity, and push it on 



