90 FROM COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PART n 



atmosphere, but to plants, and brutes, and men, and 

 societies, and ethical systems, and schools of philoso- 

 phy. All these are accordingly claimed and tabu- 

 lated among the workings of evolution. But the 

 formula does not point to them. It must therefore 

 be improved in some way. We may turn here to 

 theism, using it as of old in supplement to the for- 

 mulas of science. God works on nature from out- 

 side. Evolution causes nothing. It may be God's 

 method. He causes all these great results. Or else 

 the formula must be amended, and we must interpret 

 the process by its highest stages, not by its lowest 

 by life and thought rather than by matter and force. 

 This issue must really be fairly faced. Either life 

 and thought are an anomalous by-product (whatever 

 that may mean) in the story of a universe which is 

 purely and essentially material ; or life and thought 

 are the interpretation of nature the end for which 

 it exists the hinted justification of its age-long 

 travail and agony. The two opposing views come 

 out very clearly in Mr. Fiske's version of Spencer's 

 positions, and one is glad to know that, of later years, 

 in Mr. Fiske's case, the higher and nobler view has 

 gained much ground at the expense of the other. To 

 merge these new orders of existence under the vague 

 heading of "growing complexity" to assimilate 

 them to purely mechanical redistributions is not 

 fair-play. The result is this: in his general philo- 

 sophical appeal, Spencer assumes that all existence 

 /reveals a gradual ascent upwards upwards, i.e., to 

 life and thought.*^ And the knowledge that life and 

 thought have emerged on this earth inclines men to 

 regard favourably the claim of evolutionism to serve 



