UNIVER 



CHAP, viii EVOLUTION SPENf 



as a philosophy. But, when he comes to state his 

 system in detail, the very attempt to trace unity of 

 process is abandoned. Instead of that, we have a 

 number of parallel developments ; material simplicity 

 (homogeneous matter) passing into material complex- 

 ity (universes) ; biological simplicity (the cell) passing 

 into biological complexity (the multicellular organism); 

 psychological simplicity (the presentation or impres- 

 sion or psychical " shock ") passing into psychological 

 complexity (mind); sociological simplicity (the tribe 

 of kinsfolk) passing into sociological complexity 

 (through militarism to industrialism, the final non- 

 coercive order). ' From the formula of " growing 

 complexity " no one could have deduced, or can de- 

 duce, organisation, consciousness, history. "-'Again, 

 take Mr. Spencer's subdivisions in any one of the 

 higher sciences. It is well to review the historical 

 phenomena of human society under the heads of 

 domestic, political, ceremonial, and ecclesiastical in- 

 stitutions. These headings are drawn from know- 

 ledge of the special facts to be dealt with. Can any 

 one say that the abstract formula of growing com- 

 plexity suggests these subdivisions ? Is any light 

 thrown upon them by speaking of " aggregations of 

 matter" or "parallel redistributions of contained 

 motion " ? The great German idealistic philosophies 

 may claim our faith, or they may find us no better 

 than doubting Thomases, but at least we owe them 

 this admission, they have tried to exhibit the 

 world we know as the necessary realisation of one 

 great principle in stage after stage. Mr. Spencer 

 has not been bold enough or rash enough to at- 

 tempt this. But, without doing it, he claims all 



