104 FROM COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PART n 



unless one has read the Science of Ethics very care- 

 lessly, no reference is made to the doctrine in Stephen's 

 moral system, and it seems to go for little with him. 

 Indeed, his first view of evolutionism hailed it as a new 

 stick for beating the intuitionalist dog withal a new 

 reason for rejecting the conception of ready-made and 

 all authoritative ideas in the human mind. And when 

 he conceived the possibility and desirableness of a new 

 system of morals, he had not in view a worthier ethic 

 than utilitarianism, but rather one more fully in har- 

 mony with new scientific truths. Science, not philos- 

 ophy, demanded the change. Evolutionism must be 

 given effect to. If the change results in a more 

 adequate statement of moral ideas, that is, for Mr. 

 Stephen, a secondary matter. The great thing with 

 him, as on a broader canvas with Mr. Spencer, is to 

 unify thought. One fresh province is to be gained 

 for the master principle, evolution. As Prussia Prus- 

 sianises its Polish dominions, as Russia desires to 

 Russianise Finland, so Mr. Stephen evolutionises his 

 ethics. Of course in each case the conquered is as- 

 sured that ultimately his own interests will be served 

 through accepting the rfgime dictated by the con- 

 queror. 



When dealing with Comte, we suggested a difficulty 

 for thorough-going phenomenalism in the very con- 

 ception of duty ; and we argued that Comte uses the 

 doctrine of the social organism as justifying the claim 

 for individual submission to the" public weal. Mr. 

 Stephen also makes an appeal to biology, but he does 

 not directly employ that appeal as a basis of ethics. 

 He begins more simply, by accepting current moral 

 judgments. Science deals with facts ; well! these are 



