CHAP, x "SCIENCE OF ETHICS" 1 05 



facts. Ideal ethics, indeed, are no facts of everyday 

 experience ; but Mr. Stephen tells us that he has noth- 

 ing so he says ; nothing to do with ideal ethics. 

 It is the current rules, which have been historically 

 recognised and appealed to, for which he desires to 

 find a scientific basis. Mainly he is concerned with 

 defining ethics with reaching greater accuracy than 

 is possible for the colloquial judgments of mankind. 

 His voyage is one of survey and measurement. Ulti- 

 mately his reasonings must bear on the question of 

 the justification of ethical judgments ; primarily, he is 

 concerned with their precise statement. And, indeed, 

 precision is one great mark of science, along with 

 exhaustiveness and coherence. 



What, then, has evolutionism done for him ? First, 

 it has taught him that every organism strives to attain 

 to its maximum efficiency. Darwin, indeed, has 

 pointed out that the organism which fails to strive, or 

 fails to attain, fails also to survive. There is, how- 

 ever, little direct Darwinism in the Science of Ethics; 1 

 and in its absence Mr. Stephen's view of an organism 

 sounds almost Lamarckian dreadful word ! or 

 even more dreadful still Spinozistic. He has 

 borrowed from science the fact that each organism 

 seeks maximum efficiency. Darwin's view of the 

 reason of that fact he accepts rejoicingly; but he 

 does not utilise it. 



Secondly : he agrees with many predecessors in 

 holding that society is essentially organic ; and he 

 gives the usual and correct interpretation of that 

 statement, viz. that in society, as in plants or ani- 



1 Some passages on pp. 72, 73, 91, 92, where Mr. Stephen does 

 Darwinise, are quoted in Williams's Evolutional Ethics, 419, 420. 



