CHAP, x "SCIENCE OF ETHICS" 107 



So far as he thinks of any competition, the competi- 

 tion is rather between the claims of the individual 

 man and the claims of society. Each man is an or- 

 ganism, immersed in the thickest of the struggle for 

 existence, striving to do the best for himself. But then, 

 society too is an organism ; and it also strives ; and its 

 precepts cut across the blind self-interest of the natural 

 man checking it, modifying it, perhaps overruling it. 

 Morality then it is a hypothesis, but a strong one 

 consists in the recognised and approved conditions 

 of social efficiency. There are, however, some quali- 

 fications. So far as social well-being implies indi- 

 vidual physical well-being, we do not (unless in a 

 secondary degree) count the observance of such con- 

 ditions among moral duties. It is not a moral act to 

 eat when one is hungry it is natural. Nature se- 

 cures our doing that ; society need not trouble about 

 the matter; and morality which is the voice of 

 society, protecting the interests of the race if it 

 speaks of prudential regard to one's health and inter- 

 ests as a duty, gives prudence a comparatively low 

 position among the virtues. Whatever is the out- 

 come of organic natural impulse forms rather a pre- 

 supposition than a part of morality. Further 

 consulting, as I understand him, the usage of lan- 

 guage Mr. Stephen is inclined to confine the epi- 

 thet " moral " to altruistic actions. Ordinary conscious 

 action in one's own interest seems independent of the 

 moral spur. It seems to stand almost, though not 

 quite, on the same level with natural instinct. But 

 with these two qualifications that morality does not 

 include those conditions of social efficiency which are 

 taken care of by instinct, nor yet those in which the 



