Il8 FROM COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PART n 



instantly a relapse into hedonism, and that of the 

 selfish sort. Granted the moral judgment given 

 a soul devoted to the social weal Mr. Stephen 

 offers vigorous and pointed encouragement, and dis- 

 suades one from being argued out of obedience to 

 conscience. But, if the moral judgment be disputed, 

 and if any soul prefers his own private weal, Mr. 

 Stephen gives no help. To call selfish men " idiots " 

 merely because they distinguish meum from tuum is 

 not helpful. Tastes differ that is the last word on 

 these questions, if we adopt Mr. Stephen's premises. 

 One thing more we might be tempted to inquire, 



How far is this whole mode of looking at morals 

 true and serviceable ? But hitherto we have raised 

 no such issue, and it would hardly be wise to discuss 

 it at this particular point. Only so much we may 

 say : if the community is to be the authority in 

 ethics it must not be narrowly identified with any 

 external society; and that which it lays down as 

 duty must not be merely what is socially convenient 



still less, what is convenient for society and costly 

 to the individual ; duty must include absolute and 

 ideal elements, whose fulfilment is quite as much for 

 the interest (in the true sense) of the individual as 

 for that of society. But, granted some such deeper 

 view of society, it may be useful to have a statement 

 of morality as the single or continuous human ideal, and 

 to have this in terms of biology. It is well, too, that 

 one of the biologising moralists should emphasise, not 

 obscure subconscious possibilities of organic change, 

 but the knowable influences of human education and 

 historic culture. We shall quote Mr. Stephen for 

 this at a later point. 



