CHAP, xi "DARWINISM IN MORALS" 123 



remains what it was in the brute nature (social 

 instinct for example, as the germ of morality) ; it now 

 wields an instrument of incomparably greater power, 

 but its own nature and its aims are unaltered. We 

 shall have to give further study to this view of reason 

 later on. Here we must simply affirm the counter 

 position, that reason transforms and revolutionises 

 everything. In this case as in many others, develop- 

 ment means transformation. A man is not an 

 ascidian, even if he is descended from one. Nor is 

 human morality the pursuance of animal sociality 

 with the resources of human intellect. No ; it is a 

 new aim, as well as a new method ; on the theoretical 

 side, reason; on the practical side, morality, strictly 

 and properly so-called. As such, it has suppressed, 

 is suppressing, and will suppress those evil things 

 evil at least between man and man, if not between 

 beast and beast which instinct tolerates or fosters. 

 If, however, we take this view of the meaning of 

 evolution, there seems no reason why the abstract 

 formula of " Darwinism in Morals " should be fatal 

 to the higher interests of mankind, or to the basis of 

 Christian faith. 



