136 FROM COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PART ill 



of the moral consciousness are cut short its dicta 

 are edited or expurgated with a view to securing 

 harmony, not with each other, but with a determin- 

 istic view of the universe borrowed from physics. 

 True, the frontier of morality is extended a long way 

 in certain directions. With admirable faithfulness 

 Mr. Alexander reports that conscience passes its 

 judgments on willed conduct only on willed con- 

 duct ; yet scarcely is this admitted when free will is 

 mockingly expelled from the court unheard free 

 will, the one further truth which gives meaning and 

 justification to our human habit of passing judgment 

 only upon will. Why is free will exiled ? What pro- 

 cured this order from the judge ? Morality did not 

 require it; conscience asked nothing of the kind; 

 victorious prejudice, and the tyranny of physical 

 science, carried the day. That is not the way to 

 provide our subject with a scientific frontier ! It 

 results in a haphazard frontier pushed far on, at 

 one point, to suit the requirements of our own posi- 

 tion, but then cut short to suit the requirements of 

 other people across the border. Mr. Alexander is 

 loyal to the psychological fact that we judge only 

 willed conduct ; he takes care to report it accurately ; 

 but what does he make of it ? Stated in isolation, is 

 it not meaningless ? 



We see now in how restricted a sense moral facts 

 are admitted by Mr. Alexander. The moral con- 

 sciousness is allowed to bear testimony ; " AB is an 

 ethical conception ; " " CD is an ethical conception " 

 but that is all. The authority of conscience is good 

 to that extent and not an inch beyond. If we ask 

 the further question, what is the meaning of this 



