CHAP, xm DARWINISM IN ETHICS: ALEXANDER 139 



or rather of change, which sets morality at defiance. 

 In the first half thanks to his appeal, however 

 strangely limited, to the moral consciousness he is 

 on moral ground ; the foundation is moral, whatever 

 may be the character of the superstructure. In the 

 second half he has moved off moral ground altogether. 

 The first is a theory of morality from the inside, if 

 not exactly from the heart of the subject ; the second 

 is a theory of the changes in human opinion, a view 

 taken from the outside of the moral process, and 

 characterised by the airy indifference of the foreigner. 

 In Part I. the analysis of the moral end leads to 

 the result that goodness is an equilibrium, and one of 

 a twofold order. For first, goodness is an equilibrium 

 among the promptings or desires or actions of the 

 individual ; and secondly, it is social, placing each man 

 harmoniously with his fellows in an order of society. 

 And this positive analysis is supported negatively by a 

 destructive analysis of other views of the ethical end. 

 To this extent therefore Mr. Alexander offers more 

 proof in support of evolutionism in morals than Mr. 

 Leslie Stephen gave us. Intuitionalism of course 

 receives no attention. Intuitionalism holds that the 

 good, like other primary elements of consciousness, 

 cannot be decomposed, and neither can nor need be 

 defined. It is hardly strange that one who is seeking 

 a definition of the moral end should pass over such 

 views in impatient silence. But, if intuitionalism is 

 not discussed, a kindred position is faced when the 

 definition of the end as perfection is brought under 

 notice. This, says Mr. Alexander, gives no help. It 

 carries us no further. Perfectly what should I be ? 

 Perfectly good, of course. But I am asking you what 



