CHAP, xiii DARWINISM IN ETHICS: ALEXANDER 145 



weeding out of the unfit. Progress according to Mr. 

 Alexander is usually secured by a conversion from 

 error to truth. It is a secondary result that errors 

 disappear. And those who were formerly in the 

 grasp of error do not die, but believe the truth and 

 live. 



Yes, it may be said, the errors die. Is not that 

 enough to justify the analogy ? Let us look then a 

 little more closely at the alleged mechanism of moral 

 progress. Variation constitutes, says Mr. Alexander, 

 a new species or new ideal> before which, after a sea- 

 son of struggle, old species or old ideals perish. Does 

 not this statement ignore the fundamental continuity 

 of life throughout all evolution ? The "new species " 

 is an old species modified. The new ideal is not 

 wholly new ; it is the fuller evolution or unfolding of 

 the old, what Hegel called its truth. 



For of ideals above all things we may declare that 

 they do not struggle blindly against each other, or 

 exclude each other. They are not physically distinct 

 things, mutually incompatible, mutually repulsive. 

 Was there ever an ideal with a lower programme 

 than that of the supreme Teacher, " Not to destroy, 

 but to fulfil " ? The point may be illustrated by a 

 quotation from John M'Leod Campbell: "An early 

 member of the Society of Friends, writing to a 

 brother who was a Roman Catholic, says, ' Your re- 

 ligion and my religion must be the same, in so far as 

 we have religion, for there is but one religion.' This 

 true and deep word/' adds Campbell, " we are gradu- 

 ally learning to understand." May we not even more 

 confidently say the same thing of moral ideals ? There 

 is but one ideal. The various forms in which, histori- 



