152 FROM COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PART in 



alleged to be connected with their Pantheistic evolu- 

 tionism ; but Huxley contends that it was really per- 

 fectly independent of its speculative background; 

 and that is very likely true. Coming down to modern 

 times, he complains that discovery of " the evolution 

 of ethics " has led men, in much confusion of thought, 

 to preach an " ethics of evolution " ; whereas no such 

 thing exists. Good of course has been evolved but 

 so has evil; beauty has arisen in evolution and 

 ugliness too ; what survives after struggle is " fittest 

 to survive," but not necessarily best or noblest. 

 Briefly, cosmical and ethical tendencies are opposite. 

 We human beings have to develop our own ideas of 

 justice; the bad, blind world can neither guide nor 

 help us. In the past, struggle was of service when 

 it gave man domain over the creatures (as theologians 

 express it) a curious hint. But now the remainders 

 of struggle poison man's higher life. 



Perhaps this is seasonable discourse. After all, 

 nature and spirit are different things, and, if philoso- 

 phy drops below pantheism into downright material- 

 ism and atheism, then too probably it will undermine 

 morality. Nevertheless we must not exaggerate the 

 difficulties of the case, or leap prematurely to the 

 sorry conclusion that nature is in opposition to mo- 

 rality. We are not obliged to rush into either extreme. 

 Because we hesitate to recognise evolution as the key 

 to ethics, we are not bound to regard evolution as 

 anti-ethical. Huxley seems very one-sided when he 

 draws a sharp contrast between the best and those 

 fittest to survive. Bagehot and Mr. Leslie Stephen 

 teach a different lesson. Among human societies it 

 is probably fair to assume that in the majority of 



