160 FROM COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PART in 



to overrule. Provided only a sufficiently deep view 

 of intelligence or reason be held, provided we see 

 clearly that reason transforms, perfects, makes new, 

 what it seems to inherit from brute nature, we need 

 not be afraid for morality though it should universally 

 be taught that morality came into being by slow and 

 gradual fashioning of brute impulse. 



A somewhat different objection is in the view of 

 Huxley and Drummond, not the origin of con- 

 science, not the inheritance of moral instinct from 

 brutes, but the swamping (as it were) of moral instinct 

 in the great current of cosmic process, regarded as a 

 struggle for existence. If all nature struggles blindly 

 and selfishly, what should man be but a " strugforli- 

 feur " like the villain in Daudet's novel ? If reason, so 

 we may interpret the difficulty in the light of Mr. Ben- 

 jamin Kidd's work, the destined goal of our present 

 study if reason teaches man that the whole ani- 

 mated cosmos has been and is controlled by a strug- 

 gle for existence, and by that struggle has been 

 pushed onward and upward, what can man do but 

 reverently bow down before blind selfishness, and 

 practise it in his own life ? Mr. Huxley, a man of 

 science among the moralists, a Saul among the 

 prophets, advancing boldly like Athanasius contra 

 mtmdum, preached the absolute opposition of human 

 morality to cosmic process, and called on his fellow- 

 men to be moral in spite of the nature of things, the 

 cruel, selfish, pain-dealing nature of things, from 

 which we of the human race have arisen. 



Mr. Drummond and others agree with Huxley and 

 the " strugforlifeur " as to the effect of Darwin's 

 views. But they argue that Darwin's views are one- 



