CHAPTER XVII 



THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURAL SELECTION 



I. Chance in relation to purpose, as accident As absence of design 

 In relation to law ; as blind law As blind combination of 

 laws Compare with the last the scientific or mechanical view 

 of the world ; a number of separate substances ruled by a number 

 of independent laws Good enough for science, not for philos- 

 ophy Darwin ought not to assume things as really discon- 

 nected, merely because he has not needed to investigate their 

 connection As if organism and environment were accidentally 

 brought together Or as if organism and organism were mere 

 rivals (They are rivals !) Or as if force and force were dis- 

 connected? 



II. Darwin treats variation as casual, i.e. as a thing with no bearing 

 in itself on the purpose of the species His theory allows this 

 assumption But does not prove it We all habitually under- 

 stand the theory in that sense, e.g. in contrasting natural selec- 

 tion with use-inheritance On the fact, evidence is wanted 

 Conceivably variation may choose very irregularly between many 

 fixed possibilities This seems to point back to disconnected 

 laws, as in last section 



III. Even on Darwin's own view he is hardly entitled to call the process 

 of evolution natural selection Aggregate range of possible 

 variation is fixed by the nature of the material Two agencies 

 must be taken together Of the two the varying organism, not 

 the blindly selecting environment, seems the better to account 

 for rise of new qualities Summary of I., II., III. 



IV. Kinds of natural selection, A, B, and C B exists ! If organic 

 evolution is a fact, C exists ! Accelerating any other evolution- 

 ary force that may exist, and of course involving B If A is 

 found alongside of C, A must have a separate field where C can- 

 not enter, else inconsiderable Natural selection (C) lasts as 

 long as nature is nature Even along with (the more rapid 

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