CHAP, xvii METAPHYSICS OF NATURAL SELECTION 187 



in summing up results, we are led to insist on a dis- 

 tinction. While we admit, and even (so far as we 

 have any right to speak) defend, the theory of natural 

 selection in biology, we affirm that it cannot be ap- 

 plied in sociology or morals. Such a view seems to 

 need justification. It can only be supported by a 

 review, however hurried and imperfect, of the merits 

 of Darwinism. 



The question may perhaps best be approached by a 

 discussion of the element of chance contained, or said 

 to be contained, in the Darwinian theory. Perhaps 

 some minds love Darwinism, because it appeals to 

 chance ; others undoubtedly distrust and despise it 

 for that reason. What is chance ? Does Darwinism 

 assert chance, and, if so, in what sense ? How far is 

 it warranted in doing so ? 



First and most simply, chance is the opposite of 

 purpose. It implies a failure of purpose where the 

 presence of purpose and its successful realisation were 

 expected. A train is meant to carry me safely to my 

 journey's end- that is purpose. Instead of doing so 

 it runs off the rails ; the natural forces set to work 

 were imperfectly known or imperfectly controlled. 

 That is accident, not purpose. Neither the passen- 

 gers nor the company's servants designed that result. 

 When a young rough puts a stone upon the track, and 

 wrecks a train, that is not " accident," though by a 

 natural extension of the term we may call it so. That 

 is not chance, but wicked purpose. It is crime. 



Darwinism does not exactly assert chance in this 

 sense, although it may seem to do so. Apparently 



