1 88 FROM COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PART in 



Darwin himself believed that he had destroyed the 

 evidence in support of purpose or design in nature. 

 J. S. Mill, too, looking at the new doctrine, thought 

 that, if it were established, it would substitute chance 

 for design. The evidence for the latter would go 

 to pieces on the " plurality of causes." But even if 

 Darwinism should be held to destroy teleology, such 

 a view involves using the word " chance " in a sense 

 markedly different from that in which we have denned 

 it above. Chance or "accident" in human life means 

 partial failure of purpose through man's weakness 

 or ignorance partial failure standing out in sharp 

 relief against a background of habitual success. He 

 aimed, as he always does, but he missed the mark 

 this time. That is what we mean (so far) when we 

 say "the disaster was due to chance;" "he had a 

 dreadful accident yesterday. " There is no full parallel 

 between this and Darwin's wholesale denial of teleol- 

 ogy in nature. There was no one to take aim, hints 

 Darwin. 



Moreover, it is not enough to deny teleology. It is 

 necessary, if you are to carry weight, that you give a 

 plausible explanation of the fact that nature mimics 

 purpose. Darwin has given such an explanation. 

 What part does chance play in it? 



If we cannot fully interpret chance by a reference 

 to telic purpose, we must bring it into relation with 

 efficient causation or causal law, as we ordinarily 

 phrase it ; efficient cause, or that scientific conception 

 of cause which stands nearer to efficiency than to 

 any other of Aristotle's " causes," having well-nigh 

 monopolised the name of cause in the minds of 

 modern men. 



