CHAP, xvn METAPHYSICS OF NATURAL SELECTION 2OI 



the mechanical addition to each other of separate 

 forces interfering with one another's drift. In the 

 present instance, the forces in question are of the 

 nature of hereditary tendencies. But, while we sug- 

 gest this view tentatively, as good science, we are 

 sure that it cannot be the final truth on the point. 

 The last word upon most topics must be spoken not 

 by science but by philosophy. 



Ill 



The phrase Natural Selection. Thirdly, we have 

 still further to inquire whether, even on Darwin's own 

 view of evolution, the name natural selection is quite 

 a fair description of the evolutionary process. Dar- 

 win the biologist may be right in his facts and causes, 

 and yet Darwin the philosopher may be wrong in the 

 emphasis he throws upon different features in his 

 system, or in the wider suggestions that grow out of 

 his statements of biological doctrine. Now, Darwin's 

 language seems to attribute greater scope to chance 

 than is allowed to it by the deliberate processes of 

 his thinking. The name natural selection seems to 

 imply that progress is due, though negatively and 

 indirectly, to the environment alone. Organisms 

 evolve, it would seem, because of a foreign influence, 

 forcing advance on the reluctant materials. The 

 whole cause of progress lies in the selecting envi- 

 ronment, not in the varying organism ; and selection 

 proceeds blindly by destruction of the unfit. Here 

 again we have the spirit of the doctrine of chance. 

 We see it partly in the assumption that organism and 

 environment have nothing to do with each other, 



