206 FROM COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PART in 



IV 



Before we go on to test the applicability of natural 

 selection to human affairs we may do well to ask 

 whether, in the interpretation of physical nature, 

 " natural selection " is not invoked in different 

 senses. We are haunted by ambiguity. " Darwin- 

 ism " is an ambiguous expression. The central con- 

 tribution of Darwin to evolutionary theory was the 

 doctrine of natural selection ; yet that by itself is 

 hyper-Darwinism ; in the master's hands Darwinism 

 means natural selection plus use-inheritance plus sex- 

 ual selection ; these three, at any rate. So, when 

 natural selection is used as a synonym for Darwinism, 

 it must prove most ambiguous. May we take for 

 granted that variation is non-telic and yet constitutes 

 new species ? Let us call this natural selection A. 

 Are we to regard natural selection merely as a force 

 that prevents relapse by weeding out possible evil 

 specimens? Let us call this natural selection B. 

 Or are we to regard it as a positive source of prog- 

 ress when in alliance with other evolutionary forces 

 (telic variation, use-inheritance, sexual selection, a 

 more general working of intelligence ; all these are 

 candidates for the position) secondary to them, 

 and accelerating their operation ? 1 Let us call this 



1 The intelligent reader will easily perceive that the analysis in the 

 text is far from being final. Is A everything? That is hyper-Darwin- 

 ism. Is A something but not everything? That view might be held. 

 Is A a logical possibility in some departments rather unlikely to be 

 a fact in any? That is the view argued in these pages, and so forth. 

 I trust, however, that all the distinctions have been taken which are 

 necessary for our argument in addressing intelligent readers. 



