CHAP, xvn METAPHYSICS OF NATURAL SELECTION 2O? 



natural selection C. Or, recurring to our first point 

 (letter A), are we to leave the question open what 

 the tendency of individual variations may be ? In 

 that case the meaning of "natural selection" will 

 hover between A and C. This last ambiguity is per- 

 haps the worst of all. It leads to the insinuating or 

 implying of A by evolutionists when they are not 

 prepared to affirm it definitely and still less to prove 

 it. Too often when C, or even the truism B, is 

 established, we are asked to admit that "natural 

 selection " has been proved. Indeed, the whole pro- 

 cess (C) is habitually treated as if natural selection 

 not merely entered into it but were necessarily and 

 everywhere the dominant factor in it -as if C were 

 A; as if progressive evolution, in which natural 

 selection plays some part, might safely be called 

 "progress by natural selection." 1 It is natural 

 selection A the natural selection which, according 

 to hyper-Darwinism, stands alone that incurs the 

 gravest suspicion of relying upon chance in lieu of 

 reason. And it is mainly, though not wholly, natural 

 selection A that we shall have to keep in view after 

 this. It is natural selection A that we cannot toler- 

 ate in human affairs least of all in morality and 

 religion. 



Natural Selection B is a fact. Natural selection 

 A, B, or C means primarily "struggle" and 



1 The reader will please note that we are not repeating our objec- 

 tion, developed in Part III. of this chapter. Even although we con- 

 ceded Darwin's right to speak of natural selection A, if it exists, as 

 leading to " evolution by natural selection," we must still complain of 

 his (and his friends') question -begging and misleading usage in speak- 

 ing so not only of A but of C, 



