CHAP. XVII METAPHYSICS OF NATURAL SELECTION 22C) 



would say that it goes much too far in commenda- 

 tion ; others, not far enough. 



Professor Ritchie endorses natural selection with- 

 out putting any limit to its application. It seems to 

 give him all that he needs. There is evolution in 

 Darwin, and there is evolution in Hegel; therefore 

 natural selection accounts for everything, or at least 

 it does so mutatis mutandis. We have tried to show in 

 detail what the mutation is, and it is pretty extensive. 



(On the other hand, Professor Ritchie, as social 

 philosopher, takes the opposite view, holding that 

 reason has transformed the whole evolutionary process 

 which it has touched.) 



Dr. Stirling and Mr. Sandeman, if I understand 

 them rightly, regard natural selection as a piece of 

 showy but flimsy thinking, that crumbles away as 

 you handle it. They would deny that it explains 

 anything, or that it applies to any part of the cosmos. 



Mr. Sandeman 1 believes thoroughly in the teleo- 

 logical character of organisms, and finds every exist- 

 ing species too perfect and harmonious and balanced 

 to think of "bettering itself." Instead of the real- 

 istic vision of cosmic horrors, he has a poet's vision 

 of peace. He is not content with excluding absolute 

 unfitness, but insists on denying even relative unfit- 

 ness. "Whatever is, is right." It exists, it has sur- 

 vived ; it triumphs ! Like the apostle Paul, Mr. 

 Sandeman bestows more abundant comeliness upon 

 our uncomely parts. With great force and penetra- 

 tion he observes 2 that inherited rudiments have not 



1 Problems of Biology. 



2 This is a valuable corrective or supplement to Professor Ritchie's 

 criticism of Dr. Reich, Darwinism and Politics, pp. 124, 133. 



