232 FROM COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PART in 



Now I will not attempt to criticise the metaphysics 

 of this. But I venture to assume that such thinking 

 lies too deep for science. No biologist would hesitate 

 to speak of "identical twins" or would admit that 

 heredity acts differently at each birth, merely in order 

 to put itself metaphysically in the right in its act 

 of bringing into the world a new individual. If 

 " heredity " should not differentiate individuals, " en- 

 vironment " would speedily do so. 



On the other hand, I submit that the " casual " 

 variation which science speaks of is found, when 

 science sifts its thoughts, to be one which whether 

 actual or only possible might quite well conceiva- 

 bly, by cumulation, amount in time to a new specific 

 type. Of course there are difficulties in detail under 

 Darwinism. But is Darwinism metaphysically incom- 

 petent ? Does Natural Selection A outrage common 

 sense when you understand its terms ? I think not. 

 It is certainly limited in range; it possibly exists 

 nowhere in nature as an actual process; Darwin's 

 name for his theory may be misleading ; but surely 

 the theory is conceivable. 



Finally, let us observe that, even as a fiction, 

 natural selection might be serviceable, though the 

 truth were merely that species are things which might 

 have resulted from infinitesimal changes in endless 

 time. Even on that view " natural selection " might 

 be a fruitful guide to investigation, not a blind alley. 

 Per contra the fruitfulness of natural selection as a 

 theory does not in itself certify it to be a true theory, 

 whether in whole or in part. 



