CHAP, xix HYPER-DARWINISM IN SOCIOLOGY 259 



to history. We have the doctrine of altruism assumed, 

 without inquiry or justification, as a definition of the 

 moral ideal; though it is ousted from the place of 

 legitimate authority which Comte gave it by Mr. 

 Kidd's anarchical conception of reason as purely self- 

 ish, and has to borrow its credentials from non- 

 rational religion. Above all we have the appeal to 

 biology more unhesitating than ever. 1 " It may be 

 remarked that nothing tends to exhibit more strik- 

 ingly the extent to which the study of our social phe- 

 nomena must in future be based on the biological 

 sciences, than the fact that the technical controversy 

 now being waged by biologists as to the transmission 

 or non-transmission to offspring of qualities acquired 

 during the lifetime of the parent, is one which, if de- 

 cided in the latter sense, must produce the most revo- 

 lutionary effect throughout the whole domain of social 

 and political philosophy." 2 Yes, it is striking; most 

 extremely striking; so remarkably striking, indeed, 

 that one would have expected the author to reconsider 

 the question, whether it is necessarily true, if not to 

 raise the question, whether it is even possibly true. 

 Comte himself, phenomenalist to the backbone, while 

 insisting on the connection of sociology with the lower 

 science of biology, insisted also on its separate prov- 

 ince and independent laws. Now it appears that 



1 P. 203, towards end of Chap. VII. The same thing is to be noted 

 in Mr. Platt-BalPs little book against use-inheritance (see Preface, 

 p. vii). 



2 Mr. Kidd differs from Mr. Sutherland (i) in appealing to the 

 working of struggle rather than that of elimination among mankind. 

 Neither really succeeds in appealing to the struggle, or to the elimina- 

 tion, implied in true natural selection; (2) Mr. Kidd allows reason to 

 do something it makes mischief! 



