280 FROM COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD PARTIV 



First, we have evolution without the assertion of 

 struggle applied to human affairs by way of analogy. 

 This is chiefly exemplified in Mr. Stephen's doctrine 

 of " social tissue," by which he serves himself heir to 

 Comte. The doctrine, however, is without authority. 

 It remains a hypothesis. We may, if we will, regard 

 morals as the laws of social welfare ; Mr. Stephen 

 would add, versus individual welfare. No proof is 

 given that we must do so. 



Again, part of Professor Alexander's theory falls 

 under this head, viz. the definition of goodness as 

 equilibrium. Here a certain amount of proof is 

 offered us, viz. indirectly, in the form of hostile 

 criticism of rival naturalistic theories; along with 

 which we have Mr. Alexander's assurance that the 

 measure of truth contained in idealistic ethics is in- 

 corporated in his own formula* We see no possible 

 reason to forbid the assertion that goodness is an 

 equilibrium, it is in the further working out of his 

 views that Mr. Alexander seems to compromise the 

 interests of morality. But we remain unconvinced 

 that " equilibrium " is either the best or the only defi- 

 nition of moral excellence. 



Secondly, we have evolution still without vital 

 incorporation of the conception of struggle in Mr. 

 Herbert Spencer, but now applied not simply by way 

 of " analogy " to the " social organism," but also 

 and emphatically to the whole cosmic process, 1 

 society included. At least, that is the effort of Mr. 

 Spencer's philosophy. In its working out, as we 



1 If Spencer is biological at all, it is in conceiving the universe itself 

 as an organism. But that organism, by the definition, has no environ- 

 ment! 



