264 TUE GENESIS OF SPECIES. [Chap. 



abstain from making use of sucli conceptions, he is thereby 

 necessarily reduced to others of an inferior order. Mr. H. 

 Spencer says,* " Those who espouse this alternative posi- 

 tion make the erroneous assumption that the choice is be- 

 tween personality and something lower than i)ersonality ; 

 whereas the choice is rather between personality and some- 

 thing higher. ]s it not just possible that there is a mode 

 of being as much transcending intelligence and will as 

 these transcend mechanical motion ? " 



" It is true we are totally unable to conceive any such 

 higher mode of being. But this is not a reason for ques- 

 tioning its existence ; it is rather the reverse." " May we 

 not therefore rightly refrain from assigning to the ' ultimate 

 cause' any attributes whatever, on the ground that such 

 attributes, derived as they must be from our own natures, 

 are not elevations but degradations ? " The way, how- 

 ever, to arrive at the object aimed at (i. e., to obtain the 

 best attainable conception of the First Cause) is not to re- 

 frain from the only concejjtioiis possible to us, hwt to seek 

 the very liighest of these, and then declare their utter inad- 

 equacy; and this is precisely the course which lias been 

 pursued by theologians. It is to be regretted that, before 

 writing on this matter, Mr. Spencer did not more tliorough- 

 ly acquaint himself with the ordinary doctrine on the sub- 

 ject. It is always taught in the Church schools of divinity, 

 that nothing, not even existence, is to be predicated unlvo- 

 cally of " God " and " creatures ; " that, after exhausting 

 ingenuity to arrive at the loftiest possible conceptions, we 

 must declare them to be utterly inadequate ; that, after all, 

 they are but accommodations to human inlirmity; that 

 they are in a sense objectively false (because of their inad- 

 equacy), though subjectively and very practically true. 

 But the difference between this mode of treatment and that 

 adopted by Mr. Spencer is wide indeed ; for the practical 



® Loc. cit., p. 109. 



