EXISTENCE. 



it be not altogether so certain as intuition 

 and demonstration, yet deserves the name 

 of knowledge, if we persuade ourselves 

 that our faculties act and inform us right 

 concerning the existence of those objects 

 that affect them : but besides the assur- 

 ance we have from our senses themselves, 

 that they do not err in the information 

 they give us of the existence of things 

 without us, we have other concurrent 

 reasons ; as, first, it is plain these per- 

 ceptions are produced in us by external 

 causes affecting our senses, because 

 those that want "the organs of any se:.se 

 never can have the ideas belonging to 

 that sense produced in their minds. Se- 

 condly, because' we find sometimes that 

 we cannot avoid the having those ideas 

 produced in our minds. When my eyes 

 are shut, I can, at pleasure, recal to my 

 mind the ideas of light, or the sun, which 

 former sensations had lodged in my me- 

 morv ; but if I turn my eyes towards the 

 sun, I cannot avoid the ideas which the 

 light of the sun then produces in me ; 

 which shews a manifest difference be- 

 tween those ideas laid up in the memory, 

 and such as force themselves upon us, and 

 we cannot avoid having ; besides, there 

 is nobody who doth not perceive the dif- 

 ference in himself between actually look- 

 ing on the sun, and contemplating the 

 idea he has of it in his memory ; and 

 therefore he hath certain knowledge that 

 they are not both memory or fancy. 

 Thirdly, add to this, that many ideas are 

 produced in us with pain, which we after- 

 wards remember without the least of- 

 fence : thus, the pain of heat or cold, 

 when the idea of it is revived in our 

 minds, give us no disturbance, which, 

 when felt, was very troublesome ; and 

 we remember the pain of hunger, thirst, 

 head-ach, &c. without any pain at all, 

 which would either never disturb us, or 

 else constantly do it, as often as we thought 

 of it, were there no more but ideas float- 

 ing in our minds, and appearances enter- 

 taining our fancies, without the real ex- 

 istence of things affecting us from abroad. 

 Fourthly, our senses, in many cases, bear 

 witness to the truth of each other's report 

 concerning the existence of sensible 

 things without us : he that doubts when 

 he sees a fire, whether it be real, may, if 

 he pleases, feel it too, and by the exqui- 

 site pain may be convinced that it is not 

 a bare idea, or phantom." 



Dr. Berkeley, on the other hand, con- 

 tends, that external bodies have no exist- 

 ence but in the mind perceiving them, 

 or that they exist no longer than they are 

 perceived: his principal arguments, which 



several others, as well as himself, esteem 

 a demonstration of this system, are as 

 follow : " That neither our thoughts, 

 passions, or ideas formed by the imagina- 

 tion, exist, without the mind, is allowed ; 

 and that the various sensations impressed 

 on the mind, whatever objects they com- 

 pose, cannot exist otherwise than in a 

 mind perceiving them, is equally evident, 

 This appears from the meaning of the 

 term exist, when applied to sensible 

 things : thus, the table I write on exists, 

 i. e. I see and feel it, and were I out of 

 my study I should say it existed, i e that 

 were I in my study I should see and feel 

 it as before. There was an odour, i. e. I 

 smelt it, &c.; but the existence of un- 

 thinking beings, without any relation to 

 their being perceived, is unintelligible : 

 their ease Ispercipi." Then, to shew that 

 the notion of bodies is grounded on the 

 doctrine of abstract ideas, " What," he 

 asks, " are light and colours, heat and 

 cold, extension and figure, in a word, 

 the things we see and feel, but so many 

 sensations, notions, ideas, or impressions 

 on the sense; and is it possible to sepa- 

 rate, even in thought, any of these from 

 perception ? The several bodies, then, 

 that compose the frame of the world, 

 have not any subsistence without a mind : 

 their esse is to be perceived or known ; 

 and if they are not perceived by me, nor 

 by any other thinking being, they have 

 no shadow of existence at all: the things 

 we perceive are colour, figure, motion, 

 &c. that is, the ideas of those things ; but 

 has an idea any existence out of the mind? 

 To have an idea is the same thing as to 

 perceive ; that, therefore, wherein co- 

 lour, figure, &c. exist, must perceive 

 them. It is evident, therefore, that there 

 can be no unthinking substance, or sub- 

 stratum of those ideas. But you may ar- 

 gue, if the ideas themselves do not exist 

 without the mind, there may be things 

 like them, whereof they are copies or re- 

 semblances, which exist without the mind. 

 It is answered, an idea can be like nothing 

 but an idea, a colour or figure can be 

 nothing else but another colour or figure. 

 It may be farther asked, whether those 

 supposed original or external things, 

 whereof our ideas are the pictures, be 

 themselves perceivable or not? If they 

 be not, I appeal to any one, whether it 

 be sense to say a colour is like somewhat 

 which is invisible, hard or soft, like some- 

 what untangible, &.c. Some distinguish 

 between primary and secondary quali- 

 ties ; the former, viz. extension, solidity, 

 figure, motion, res', and number, have a 

 real existence out of the mind ; for the 



