GOD. 



knowledge, and operating blindly, and 

 without any perception, should produce a 

 knowing being, as it is impossible that a 

 triangle should make itself three angles 

 greater than two right ones. Thus, from 

 the consideration of ourselves, and what 

 we infallibly find in our own constitutions, 

 our reason leads us to the knowledge of 

 this certain and evident truth, that there 

 is an eternal, most powerful, and knowing 

 Being, which whether any one will cMl 

 God, it matters not. The thing is evi- 

 dent ; and from this idea, duly consider- 

 ed, will easily be reduced all those other 

 attributes we ought to ascribe to this 

 eternal Being. 



" From what has been said, it is plain 

 to me, that we have a more certain know- 

 ledge of the existence of a God, than of 

 any thing our senses have not immediate- 

 ly discovered to us. Nay, I presume I 

 may say, that we more certainly know 

 that there is a God, than that there is any 

 thing else without us. When I say we 

 know, I mean, there is such a knowledge 

 within our reach, which we cannot miss, 

 if we will but apply our minds to that as 

 we do to several other inquiries. 



" It being then unavoidable for all ra- 

 tional creatures to conclude that some- 

 thing has existed from eternity, let us 

 next see what kind of a thing that must 

 be. There are but two sorts of beings in 

 the world, that man knows or conceives ; 

 such as are purely material, without sense 

 or perception ; and sensible perceiving 

 beings, such as we find ourselves to be. 

 These two sorts we shall call cogitative 

 and incogitative beings; which, to our 

 present purpose, are better than material 

 and immaterial. 



" If then there must be something eter- 

 nal, it is very obvious to reason that it 

 must necessarily be a cogitative being ; 

 because it is as impossible to conceive that 

 bare incogitative matter should ever pro- 

 duce a thinking intelligent being, as that 

 nothing of itself should produce matter. 

 Let us suppose any parcel of matter eter- 

 nal, we shall find it in itself unable to pro- 

 duce any thing. Let us suppose its parts 

 firmly at rest together; if there were no 

 other being in the world, must it not eter- 

 nally remain so, a dead inactive lump ? is 

 it possible to conceive that it can add mo- 

 lion to itself, or produce any thing ? Mat- 

 ter then, by its own strength, cannot pro- 

 duce in itself so much as motion. 1 The 

 motion it has must also be from eternity, 

 or else added to matter by some other be- 

 ing more powerful than matter. But let 

 is suppose motion eternal too ; but yet 

 matter* incogitative matter, and motion, 



could never produce thought. 

 ledge will still be as far beyond the pow- 

 er of nothing to produce. Divide matter 

 into as minute parts as you will, vary 

 its figure and motion as much as you 

 please, it will operate no otherwise upon 

 other bodies of proportionable bulk, than 

 it did before this division. The minutest 

 particles of matter repel and resist one 

 another just as the greater do, and that is 

 all they can do ; so that if we suppose 

 nothing eternal, matter can never begin 

 to be ; if we suppose bare matter without 

 motion eternal, motion can never begin 

 to be ; if we suppose only matter and 

 motion eternal, thought can never begin 

 to be ; for it is impossible to conceive 

 that matter, either with or without mo- 

 tion, could have, originally, in and from 

 itself, sense, perception, and knowledge, 

 as is evident from hence, that then 

 sense, perception, and knowledge, must 

 be" a property eternally inseparable from 

 matter, and every particle of it. Since, 

 therefore, whatsoever is the first eternal 

 being must necessarily be cogitative ; 

 and whatsoever is first of all things must 

 necessarily contain in it, and actually have, 

 at least, all the perfections that can ever 

 after exist, it necessarily follows, that the 

 first eternal being cannot be matter. If, 

 therefore, it be evident that something 

 must necessarily exist from eternity, it is 

 also as evident, that that something must 

 be a cogitative being. For it is as impos- 

 sible that incogitative matter should pro- 

 duce a cogitative being, as that nothing, 

 or the negation of all being, should pro- 

 duce a positive being or matter. 



" This discovery of the necessary exist- 

 ence of an eternal mind sufficiently leads 

 us to the knowledge of God ; for it will 

 hence follow, that all other knowing be- 

 ings that have a beginning must depend 

 on him, and have no other ways of know- 

 ledge or extent of power, than what he 

 gives them ; and therefore, if he made 

 those, he made also the less excellent 

 pieces of this universe, all inanimate bo- 

 dies, whereby his omniscience, power, 

 and providence, will be established ; and 

 from thence all his other attributes ne- 

 cessarily follow.'* 



With respect to Christians, it need only 

 be just mentionedj that they were very 

 early divided in opinion as to the nature 

 and essence of the Supreme Being ; a 

 great part worshipping three persons in 

 the unity of the godhead, whilst others 

 absolutely rejected a trinity of persons, 

 and asserted the unity of the divine na- 

 ture, both as to person and substance. 



With respect to the theology of tlw 



