IDE 



IDE 



there are five orders, founded upon the 

 number of the styles or female organs. 

 The myrtle, almond, and plumb, have a 

 single female organ ; the wild service, 

 two ; the service and sesuvium, three ; 

 medlar and apple, &c. five ; rose, rasp- 

 berry, strawberry, &c. an indefinite num- 

 ber. 



IDENTITY, denotes that by which a 

 thing is itself, and not any thing else ; in 

 which sense, identity differs from simili- 

 tude as well as diversity. The idea of 

 identity we owe to that power which the 

 mind has of comparing the very being and 

 existence of things, whereby, considering 

 any thing as existing at any certain time 

 and place, and comparing it with itself as 

 existing at any other time and place, we 

 accordingly pronounce it the same, or 

 different. Thus, when we see a man at 

 ' any time and place, and compare him with 

 himself, when we see him again at any 

 other time or place, we pronounce him to 

 be the same we saw before. 



To und erstand identity aright, we ought 

 to consider the essence and existence, and 

 the ideas these words stand for ; it being 

 one thing to be the same substance ; an- 

 other, the same man ; and a third, the 

 same person. For, suppose an atom exist- 

 ing at a determined time and place, it is 

 the same with itself, and will continue 

 so to be at any other instant, as long as its 

 existence continues ; and the same may 

 be said of two or any number of atoms, 

 whilst they continue together ; the mass 

 will be the same ; but if one atom be ta- 

 ken away, it is not the same mass. In 

 animated beings it is otherwise, for the 

 identity does not depend on the cohesion 

 of its constituent particles, any how unit- 

 ed in one mass ; but on such a disposition 

 and organization of parts, as is fit to re- 

 ceive and distribute life and nourishment 

 to the whole frame. Man, therefore, who 

 hath such an organization of parts partak- 

 ing of one common life, continues to be 

 the same man, though that life be commu- 

 nicated to new succetxling particles of 

 matter vitally united to the same organ- 

 ized body ; and in this consists the iden- 

 tity of man, considered as an animal only. 

 But personal identity, or the sameness of 

 an intelligent being, consists in a continu- 

 ed consciousness of its being a thinking 

 being, endowed with reason and reflec- 

 tion, capable of pain or pleasure, happi- 

 ness or misery, that considers itself the 

 same thing in different times and places. 

 By this consciousness every one is to him- 

 self, what he calls self, without consider- 

 ing whether that selfbt continued in the 



same or divers substances ; and so far as 

 this consciousness extends backward to 

 any past action, or thought, so far extends 

 the identity of that person, and makes it 

 the object of reward and punishment. 

 Hence it follows, that if the consciousness 

 went with the hand, or any other limb, 

 when severed from the body, it would be 

 the same self that was just before concern- 

 ed for the whole. And if it were possible 

 for the same man to have a distinct in- 

 communicable consciousness at different 

 times, he would, without doubt, at differ- 

 ent times make different persons ; which 

 we see is the sense of mankind as to mad- 

 men, for human laws do not punish the 

 madman for the sober man's actions, nor 

 the sober man for what the madman did, 

 thereby considering them as two persons. 



IDEAOLOGY. The philosophy of the 

 human mind. We are conscious of our 

 own existence ; and in this consciousness 

 we perceive a certain variety or succes- 

 sive change, which we distinguish by the 

 name of thought. It seems as if it would 

 be a vain attempt to investigate by what 

 physical operations the proceedings of the 

 mind may be caused, supported, or go- 

 verned. The primary objects of thought 

 are derived from our sensations or per- 

 ceptions. "We can form no conception of 

 any subject of thought, which shall not be 

 referable to the senses. During the ac- 

 tual time of sensation, we suppose our- 

 selves to be operated upon by some be- 

 ings or objects which constitute no part 

 of ourselves ; and we do not hesitate 

 to infer from those sensations, that an ex- 

 ternal universe does actually subsist. 

 Berkeley, Hume, and others, have made 

 this a subject of question ; and it must be 

 confessed, that we have no absolute proof 

 respecting it. From the certainty, how- 

 ever, that we ourselves do not cause the 

 changes which produce sensation in 

 we are irresistibly impelled to an affii 

 tive decision of this question ; which afU 

 all seems neither important nor usefu 

 more especially when we consider, ths 

 the same uncertainty pervades all 

 researches, whenever we refine so far 

 to treat of subjects which are not refei 

 ble to cause and effect. 



In many instances, the sensations we 

 experience afford some resemblance 

 the objects which cause them, as in tl 

 figures of bodies ; but in others, it is pi 

 bable that no such resemblance exists, 

 in colours, sounds, 8cc. A distinction hj 

 therefore very properly been made, be- 

 tween that which is perceived, and "" 



