IDEAOLOGY. 



eause of the perception; and, moreover, 

 as we find that effects, similar to our 

 antecedent perceptions, may and do take 

 place, though the organs of sense are not 

 then actefl. upon, we make a further dis- 

 tinction between these last, and the per- 

 ceptions themselves. We call them ideas 

 They not only resemble the perceptions, 

 as individually considered, but likewise 

 make their appearance in the same ar- 

 rangement or order of recurrence. We 

 think we perform a positive act, in many 

 instances, in bringing them forward, which 

 we call an act of the memory, or recol- 

 lection ; and their concomitant appear- 

 ance, or the succession of ideas by recol- 

 lection, in the similarity or the order of 

 the sensations, has been called the asso- 

 ciation of ideas. The same term is like- 

 wise applied, when we speak of the re- 

 currence, in idea, of an entire contem- 

 poraneous sensation, in consequence of 

 part of it being brought forward in the 

 memory. 



Much discussion has taken place among 

 philosophers, respecting the origin and 

 nature of our ideas ; in which it must be 

 confessed, that a misapplication of terms, 

 a confusion of intellectual research, with 

 an admixture of theological notions, and 

 several other causes, have united to ren- 

 der a plain subject considerably obscure, 

 even in the hands of men of much talent 

 and acuteness. In particular, it has been 

 a subject of controversy whether man 

 possesses innate ideas If an idea be the 

 recollected picture of a sensation, we must 

 surely date the possession of ideas from 

 the earliest period of the existence of an 

 animal ; and it seems absurd to deny to 

 the embryo, before birth, a consciousness 

 of the voluntary power it exerts in mus- 

 cular motion, or a power of feeling, and 

 perhaps of being affected by sounds : 

 but, without indulging any wildness of 

 conjecture, are we not compelled, when 

 we see an animal, in the first hour after its 

 birth, seek the breast by the act of smell- 

 ing,follow a visible object with its eyes,and 

 alter the adjustment of their axis accord- 

 ing to the distance of that object ; when 

 the same infant being set upon its feet, 

 immediately and correctly makes the mo- 

 tion of jumping, are we not compelled 

 to admit, as incomparably the greater pro- 

 bability, that these powers have subsisted, 

 though not exercised, in the foetal state, 

 rather than that they should have been 

 created at the instant of its birth? This 

 then is our situation with regard to innate 

 ideas, and it would be a contradiction in 

 terms to speak of innate notiens or prin- 



ciples. Those deductions of fitnesjs to ao 

 end or purpose, which constitute princi- 

 ple, certainly cannot be made till after the 

 requisite propositiops have been present- 

 ed or have occurred to the mind. Pre- 

 viously to this, the conscious being may 

 be said to possess the capacity to perceive 

 and to deduce relations ; and it seems of 

 very little consequence whether we call 

 this capacity innate or not. 



We are so constituted, that most of our 

 sensations give us either pleasure or pain; 

 and whenever these are vivid, we are put 

 into a situation of mind, respecting them, 

 called desire; namely, for the continuance 

 or return of the pleasurable sensations, 

 and for the cessation or absence of those 

 that are painful. These desires, in their 

 various modifications and combinations, 

 are distinguished by the general name of 

 the passions. Whenever they are strong 

 and urgent, they engage the mind so fully, 

 that the ordinary association of ideas, and 

 the regular processes of reason, become 

 obscured, interrupted, or suspended. A 

 continuance of this state, as when the 

 passions are exalted by disease, is called 

 insanity: and in all states of passion man 

 is more or less insane. 



None of our sensations are simple, and 

 consequently none of our ideas can be so. 

 All sensations consist of parts, represent- 

 ing parts of the objectsperceived,whetber 

 contemporaneously or in succession ; and 

 we are also capable of receiving two or 

 more sensations at the same time. Whe- 

 ther the difference between one sensation 

 and another may arise merely from the re- 

 lations of their own parts with respect to 

 each other, or from any other causes, is 

 not of importance to be discussed in this 

 place ; but it is certain that we are great- 

 ly interested in observing these relations. 

 Thus we take notice, that one thing is 

 greater or less than another; that in 

 figure, position, duration, and other af- 

 fections, they are not the same ; and that 

 certain changes in inanimate, as well as 

 in conscious beings, are, without excep- 

 tion, followed by other changes, from 

 which we are led to expect and to foretel 

 events. This last class of observations 

 establishes the doctrine of causes and 

 effects ; and a large part of our lives is 

 employed in determining the order of 

 these successions. 



Among numerous other inaccuracies 

 which tend to mislead in the investigation 

 of ideaology, a principal one is, that the 

 term idea has been confounded with that 

 of notion. Notions always grow out of 

 the relations of ideas, and they always 



