IDE 



IDI 



imply comparison. When the notion or 

 thing asserted agrees with the ideas or 

 events, (which are ideas considered in 

 succession) it constitutes truth ; if other- 

 wise, it is falshood. 



Our sensations in every case, without 

 exception, afford no more than a partial 

 indication of the nature of the objects 

 which cause them. We cannot see the 

 whole of an animal, but only one side, and 

 that very imperfectly; so that the ordinary 

 visible perception of a horse would be 

 the same, whether its hair were long or 

 short, its eyes imperfect or the contrary, 

 &c. and the recollection, or idea, of that 

 individual horse would be still more im- 

 perfect, by the omission of particular 

 variations or spots of colour, or other 

 subordinate objects ; which, though they 

 may have existed in the sensation, have 

 not remained in the memory. Thus it 

 is, from the nature of things, that some 

 part of the sensations will be abstracted, 

 or left out in the idea; and if, in reasoning 

 upon that subject, namely, the horse, a 

 comparison were to be instituted between 

 that animal and a cow, the attributes they 

 have in common would, in some cases,be 

 alone attended to, and in others form the 

 chief object of consideration. In this 

 manner, arbitrarily, or rather from the 

 necessity of the case, we constantly direct 

 our inquiries to abstract ideas, (which 

 are more or less defective, when general- 

 ly considered) instead of aitending to the 

 individuals, as we must always do in the 

 sensations; that is to say, when we ob- 

 serve and make experiments. And from 

 these obvious truths we may see how it 

 is that we acquire notions of genera, 

 species and individuals; how the first 

 elements of language are formed by ab- 

 straction ; how difficult it is to reason 

 from sensations or experiments, by the 

 use of ideas, which are their, necessarily 

 imperfect, representatives ; and how easy 

 it is for us to mislead ourselves, and 

 others, by paralogism, in the use of gene- 

 ral propositions, if we do not constantly 

 adhere to the same degrees of abstrac- 

 tion, or if we do not, in all practical ap- 

 plications, again introduce the abstracted 

 parts, which, though we may have reject- 

 ed them (like numbers in algebra) for the 

 facility of our mental process, must in- 

 variably be resumed, whenever the thea- 

 tre of nature or society is to be again en- 

 tered. 



These are the principal outlines of the 

 science which treats of ideas, or the ma- 

 terials of our knowledge, and the conduct 

 of mind, in the disposition and treatment 

 of them. Most writers have treated this 



subject either loosely and without order, 

 or, by running into divisions upon dif- 

 ferences, not of primary importance in the 

 nature of things, have confused the various 

 parts into which it most extensively 

 branches. Hence it is that we hear of 

 ideas of sensation and reflection; complex 

 ideas of modes, substances, and relations; 

 ideas distinct, confused, real, fantastical, 

 adequate, inadequate, true, and false. See 

 LANGUAGE, also UNDERSTANDING. 



IDIOM, among grammarians, properly 

 signifies the peculiar genius ot each lan- 

 guage, but is often used in a synonymous 

 sense with dialect. 



IDIOSYNCRASY, among physicians, 

 denotes a peculiar temperament of body, 

 whereby it is rendered more liable to cer- 

 tain disorders, than persons of a different 

 constitution usually are. 



IDIOTS, in law. An idiot is a fool or 

 madman from his nativity, and one who 

 never has any lucid intervals. The king 

 has the protection of him and his estate, 

 during his life, without rendering any ac- 

 count; because it cannot be presumed that 

 he will ever be capable of taking care of 

 himself or his affairs. By the old common 

 law, there is a writ deideota inquirendo, di- 

 rected to the sheriff, to inquire, by a jury, 

 whether the party be an idiot or not; and 

 if they find him a perfect idiot, the profits 

 of his lands, and the custody of his per- 

 son, belong to the king, according to the 

 statute 17 Edward IJ. c. 9, by which it is 

 enacted that the king shall have the cus- 

 tody of the lands of natural fools, taking 

 the profits ot them without waste or de- 

 struction, and shall find them necessaries, 

 of whose fee soever the land shall be 

 holden. And, after the death of such 

 idiots, he shall render it to the right heir, 

 so that such idiots shall not ahene, nor 

 their heirs be disinherited. But it seldom 

 happens that a jury finds a man an idiot 

 from his nativity ; but only non compos 

 mentis, from some particular time ; which 

 has an operation very different in point 

 of law : for, in this case, he comes under 

 the denomination of a lunatic ; in which 

 respect the king shall not have the pro- 

 fits of his lands, but is accountable for the 

 same to the lunatic, when he comes to his 

 right mind, or otherwise to his executors 

 or administrators. The king, as parent 

 patriot, has the protection of all his sub- 

 jects; and in a more peculiar manner he 

 is to take care of ail those, who, by rea- 

 son of their imbecility and want of under- 

 standing, are incapable of taking care of 

 themselves. But though a lunatic is by 

 commission to be under the care of the 



