EEVIEW OF THE MODERN DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION. 237 



in his affections to the most just ; but there is yet another reason 

 why this should be the case. 



The reproductive instinct in the lower animals has developed 

 into social affections, and these form a part of the character of 

 the higher animals and, in an especial degree, of man. The senti- 

 ments of sympathy and benevolence are j^robably outgrowths of 

 the same. While the rational faculties are concerned in the 

 knowledge of right, these sentiments are a source of the love of 

 right. This disposition is trusted by men as leading to ihQ prac- 

 tice of right, in cases where the power to enforce it is not immedi- 

 ately present. The struggle for existence then among men ranges 

 all the way from a rivalry of physical force to a rivalry for the 

 l")OSsession of human esteem and affection. The robber and assas- 

 sin of the lowest human races are represented by the slanderer and 

 defamer in the higher. The ultimate prosperity of the just, as- 

 serted and foretold by prophets and poets, is but a forecast of the 

 doctrine of the survival of the fittest. The unjust are sooner or 

 later eliminated by men from their society, either by death, seclu- 

 sion, or ostracism. 



But the organized moral qualities can not normally transcend 

 in power, as motives of human action, those which secure man's 

 physical preservation. Lines of men in whom the sympathetic and 

 generous qualities predominate over the self-preservative, must 

 inevitably become extinct. Evolution can produce no higher de- 

 velopment of the race (whatever may sometimes appear in indi- 

 viduals) than an equivalency in these two classes of forces. Be- 

 yond this the organization of the social faculties of the brain must 

 always be repressed in the race, so that we can only expect to 

 attain an equilibrium between them and the more purely selfish 

 ones, as the very highest result of unassisted evolution. In this 

 position the judgment is suspended between the opposing classes 

 of motives ; and it must ever remain doubtful in general as to 

 whether resulting action will be just and right, or the reverse. I 

 exclude from this question those generous acts which do not appear 

 to the actor to conflict with self-interest. These may be termed 

 sympathetic acts, and are quite distinct from the altruistic* The 

 sympathetic actions are seen at times in most animals. The al- 

 truistic acts, on the other hand, are those that express what is usu- 

 ally called ''moral principles." Sach acts may often coincide 



* " On the Origin of the Will." " Penn Monthly," 1877. 



