238 GENERAL EVOLUTION. 



with the interest of the actor, but so long as they do not appear 

 to him to do so, they are altruistic. It is part of the doctrine of 

 evolution that habits will ultimately disappear on the removal of 

 their stimulating cause. The moral nature originated, and has 

 been maintained, through the pressure of the fear of consequences. 

 The removal of this pressure, through the acquisition of power, 

 would then ultimately result in the diminution or loss of the moral 

 nature, through disuse. The abuses of power are well known. 

 This appears to be all that evolution can do for us in the produc- 

 tion of the moral nature. So it would appear that no organized 

 faculty of self-sufficient altruistic justice can be derived by the 

 process of mental evolution. The result is rather a continued 

 struggle between justice and injustice. It is, then, evident that 

 any power which shall cause the permanent predominance of the 

 just over the selfish faculties must be derived from without. 



After we omit from customary religion, cosmogony, which be- 

 longs to science, and theogony, which belongs to the imagination, 

 we have left an art which has for its object the development and 

 sustentation of good works or morals among men. If the teachers 

 and professors of this art produce the results in this direction at 

 which they aim, their great utility must be conceded by all. Their 

 method has the advantage over that of the law, in being of the 

 character of inducements supplied before action, instead of pains 

 and penalties inflicted after action. They strive to originate good 

 conduct, rather than to punish bad conduct. They are working 

 on the side of the originative force in development, rather than 

 the destructive ; the '^origin of the fittest y^' rather than the '^sur- 

 vival of the fittest. ^^ Whether man possesses the spontaneous power 

 called '*free will " or not, the work of supplying inducements for 

 good conduct is most useful to society. But religion, as generally 

 understood, pre-supposes free will ; and the definition of the word 

 responsibility implies its existence. The question as to the pres- 

 ence of such a faculty is an interesting one, and will now be briefly 

 considered. 



The well-known doctrine of necessity leaves no j^lace for free 

 will. All acts are the consequences of motives, and are the out- 

 come of a balancing of interests. The heaviest side of the account 

 determines action. Our physical necessities supply the motives 

 for most of our activities ; our pursuit of food and clothing is of 

 necessity, and no condition is free from it. Evolution supports 

 and explains this doctrine, as can readily be perceived. It de- 



