XXI. 



THE OEIGIN OF THE WILL. 



I. THE defikitio:n" of the will. 



Defikitioks of tlie term '"Will," as we find them in meta- 

 physical writers, are not identical ; and much apparent difference 

 of opinion depends, as usual, on this diversity of statement. Locke 

 regards the concepts *^ will "and ** freedom "as entirely distinct 

 in their nature, and not essentially related to each other. He says : 

 *^ Freedom belongs as little to the will, as swiftness to sleep, or 

 squareness to virtue. Freedom to do is one power, will to do is 

 another : will, a power of the mind exerting dominion over some 

 part of a man by employing it in or withholding it from any par- 

 ticular action ; freedom, again, a power which a man has to do or 

 to forbear doing any particular action." It appears that what 

 Locke here denominates will is that common activity of the mind 

 which expresses itself in action, which may be readily considered 

 apart from the question of choice. This doubtless expressed some- 

 thing to the metaphysicians of that time, but merely signifies to 

 the physiologist of the present day the movement derived from 

 the metamorphosis of nutritive material in the arterioles of the 

 brain, which when consciously performed are called thoughts and 

 feelings, and are the necessary precursors of a class of muscular 

 acts. The question of will properly so called is not yet entered 

 on at this point. Dr. Willis * elaborates Locke's position in the 

 following language : *^ But there is, in fact, no one particular 

 primitive faculty that wills in the human mind ; will is a general 

 term, and belongs to and is expressive of the activity of each of 

 the primitive faculties of our nature ; the benevolent faculty being 

 active, causes us to will to do good and charitable offices ; the rev- 

 erential faculty being active, to will to feel respectfully or rever- 

 ently ; the musical faculty active, to will to sing or hear music, 



* "Benedict do Spinoza: his Life, Correspondence, and Ethics," 1S70, p. 145. 



