ON THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL VIEW OF NATURE. 499 



led psychologists to consider more closely the conditions 

 under which a mathematical treatment is at all possible, 

 and to recognise that exact and accurate measurements 

 must precede all application of an abstract calculus. 

 Herbart's ideal was that of a psychical mechanics ; he 

 opposed ^ the idea of a union of physiology and 

 psychology. And yet this was just the direction in 



' In a very interesting note <at 

 the end of tlie introduction to tlie 

 second part of liis larger work on 

 psychology, Herbart explains his 

 position with regard to physiological 

 psychology. It refers to certain 

 extracts which he makes from 

 Kudolph's 'Orundriss der Physiol- 

 ogic,' in which that eminent physi- 

 ologist referred to Herbart's ' Lehr- 

 buch der Psychologic.' "It is not 

 onlj- a metaphysical but also a 

 logical en-or to confound psycho- 

 logical and phj'siological research. 

 Psychological phenomena are not 

 in space, but space itself, with all 

 that appears in it, is a psycholog- 

 ical phenomenon, and, indeed, one 

 of the first and most difficult facts 

 for psychology, which, in the treat- 

 ment of it, would behave very im- 

 ])roperly if it began l)y discussing 

 the forces iu the nerves ; for the 

 question is not, where sensations 

 come from, but how sensations 

 acquire the form of space. Now, I 

 maintain fuither, tliat tlie ditl'er- 

 ence Vietwccn lifeless and living 

 matter — that is, between physics 

 and physiology — cannot be under- 

 stood until we know mind by means 

 of p.sychologj', for in all the count- 

 less elements of the organised body 

 — in plants as well as in animals — • 

 there is an analogue of mental de- 

 velopment which cann(jt po.ssibly 

 be found on the surface of ])hen- 

 omena. We observe inteinally a 

 fragment of our own mental exist- 

 ence. This fragment is developed 

 into scientific knowledge through 



speculative psychology based on 

 I metaphysics. This knowledge 

 I meets another equally metaphy- 

 I sical science, natural philosophj', 

 with its conception of matter — 

 that is, of such inattei- as we know 

 througli chemistry and dynamics. 

 Then onlj' can the question be put, 

 how such matter must be con- 

 stituted, so that its separate ele- 

 ments are determined, not only 

 through their original quality, but 

 also through a development analo- 

 gous to the mental one,"' &c. The 

 section closes with the following 



characteristic passage 



Those 



who favour empiricism can learu 

 from the present state of physi- 

 ology how much, or rather how 

 little, mere exjierience can do. 

 Physiology, as an empirical doc- 

 trine, has attained a height which 

 nobody can despise. ]\Ioreover, it 

 proceeds in the light of modern 

 physics. Nevertheless, it has 

 eagerly sucked up, as the sponge 

 sucks u]) water, that philosophy 

 of nature which knows nothing, 

 because it began by construing the 

 universe a priori. Towards this 

 error no science has proved so 

 weak, so little capable of resist- 

 ance, as physiology. The talk 

 about life ha^ liecome tlie Dead 

 Sea in which all spirit of philo- 

 sophical research is drowned, so 

 that, if a resurrection is at all to 

 be hoped for, it must be born anew 

 in quite unbiassed minds" (' Werke,' 

 vol. vi. p. 05, &c. ) 



