PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 



prtety, be termed retention ; and to ac- 

 count for it, we infer that the mind pos- 

 sesses a power or capacity, which we may 

 call the retentive power. This then is 

 that power or capacity of the mind, by 

 which it retains relicts of sensations. 



8. Again ; it is an indisputable fact, that 

 these ideas or relicts of sensations, do not 

 remain single in the mind, but become 

 connected with one another, so that the 

 recurrence of one, or of its corresponding 

 sensation, will bring on another ; and that 

 in certain cases, they become so blended 

 together, that the parts can scarcely be 

 distinguished. Thus the word orange, 

 either pronounced or thought of, will 

 bring the idea of the appearance of an 

 orange. Again, the idea of the word house 

 is accompanied by a certain feeling, which 

 is altogether different from that which 

 accompanies the idea of the word ship : 

 if we think about it a little, we usually 

 have the idea of a particular house recall- 

 ed; this is a simple idea (or idea of sen- 

 sation or conception) connected with other 

 ideas, but not combined with them : but, 

 in general, if the word occurs without the 

 mind dwelling upon it, we may perceive an 

 indistinct feeling, which is composed of a 

 variety of simple ideas, received from a 

 variety of those objects to which we give 

 the name house. That tlie feeling is thus 

 composed we have a full right to assert, 

 on an attentive consideration of the custo- 

 mary processes of the mind. Simple ideas 

 may then be connected with other ideas ; 

 or they may blend and coalesce with other 

 ideas, so as to form new ones, which are 

 called compound or complex ideas. The 

 general fact is, that connexions and com- 

 positions take place among our ideas ; and 

 when thus connected or compounded, we 

 say that they are associated together, and 

 the connected or compounded group we 

 call an association. To account for the 

 formation of associations, we infer that the 

 mind possesses a power or capacity of 

 connecting or combining ideas, which may 

 be called the associative power. This 

 then is that power or capacity of the mind 

 by which it connects and compounds ideas. 



9. Once more ; it is obvious that with- 

 out any external excitement of the nerves 

 by which muscular motion is produced, 

 the mind can produce such motion ; in 

 other words, that state of the motory 

 nerves by which muscular motion is ef- 

 fected, can be produced by the mind. We 

 do not here inquire how the mind learns 

 to use its influence over the motory nerves, 

 but state the fact, that muscular motion 

 can be produced by the mind without ex- 



ternal excitement. To account for this, 

 we infer that the mind possesses a power 

 or capacity ot influencing the motory 

 nerves so as to produce muscular motion, 

 which may be called the motive power. 

 We have no name appropriate to those 

 states of mind which produce the changes 

 in the motory nerves requisite for muscu- 

 lar motion ; and we are, therefore, so far 

 free from a difficulty which has accom- 

 panied us when speaking of sensations 

 and ideas : these terms, as they are gene- 

 rally used, imply that the consciousness 

 of the mind is excited. But it appears an 

 almost indisputable fact, that the mental 

 organs, whatever they be, by whose ac- 

 tion the consciousness is excited, often 

 are in a state of activity without such ex- 

 citement of the consciousness ; in other 

 words, that those changes which, when 

 accompanied with consciousness, are 

 termed sensations and ideas, may take 

 place, and produce their appropriate ef- 

 fect in the mental system, without excit- 

 ing the conscious or percipient principle. 

 In order to enter into the consideration of 

 this important fact, it will be necessary to 

 consider somewhat more explicitly, in 

 what manner we employ the term mind, 

 and to introduce some less customary 

 terms, in order to avoid ambiguity. 



10. In the philosophical sense of the 

 term mind, it seems to belong exclusive- 

 ly to the conscious or percipient princi- 

 ple, whatever that be; but in common 

 language we certainly employ it differ- 

 ently : e. g. no one hesitates in saying, 

 " such a man has an extensive store of 

 knowledge in his mind;" but no one 

 supposes that at any one time a man per- 

 ceives, that is, is conscious of, all the 

 parts of that knowledge: in the same 

 manner no one would hesitate in saying, 

 " such a person has a great fund of valua- 

 ble reflections for the conduct of life 

 stored up in his mind, which he can pro- 

 duce whenever circumstances call for 

 them;" but no one supposes that those 

 reflections are always in the view of his 

 mind, that is, that he is always conscious 

 of them, that he always perceives them. 

 All that can be meant in such cases, 

 is, that the causes of his ideas (that is 

 of his thoughts and feelings) remain 

 in the mind, ready for excitement when 

 they produce ideas. Hence then the 

 mind, in the common acceptation of the 

 term in which we use it, consists of two 

 parts, the conscious or percipient princi- 

 ple, and the organized substance, which 

 furnishes to the former the objects of its 

 consciousness or percipiency. What the 



