PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 



tome object of thought, that we should 

 be ready to suppose nothing but opposi- 

 tion to* a pre-formed hypothesis could 

 lead a person to doubt, whether in such 

 cases the muscular action excited the con- 

 sciousness. Such an immense variety of 

 muscular actions are continually taking 

 place, in cases in whic^i volition was once 

 concerned, without in any way whatever 

 attracting the notice of the mind, and this 

 is so obvious a fact, and so satisfactorily 

 accounted for by Hartley, that, however 

 plausible the counter-considerations of 

 the great northern philosopher, Dugald 

 Stewart, (see Elements, chap ii.) we can- 

 not suppose that they can gain admission 

 where the principle of association Is tho- 

 roughly understood. 



13. If this distinction between sensible 

 and ideal changes, and sensations and 

 ideas, be just ; or rather, if the existence 

 of sensorial changes, without conscious- 

 ness, be admitted, (and we more and more 

 feel satisfied that it is a fact, and if so, a 

 very important one in our mental frame), 

 then the four preceding faculties, or ca- 

 pacities of the mind, are to be referred 

 to the sensorium, and are, in reality, the 

 properties or powers of the mental or- 

 gans. We feel disposed to admit, that 

 the sensorium is the medullary substance 

 of the brain ; but we beg our readers 

 to bear in mind, that what we have ad- 

 vanced is entirely independent of this 

 opinion, and that indeed it is rather 

 clogged by it. "We use the terms sen- 

 sorium and mental organs, because, in 

 our opinion, they tend to give greater dis- 

 tinctness to our reflections on what pass- 

 es within us ; but it is with no view to 

 decide whether they are material or im- 

 material. Consciousness, or the perci- 

 pient faculty, we consider as a distinct 

 faculty from those already mentioned ; it 

 is the faculty or capacity by which the 

 mind is affected by sensorial changes, 

 whether sensible, ideal, or motory. Con- 

 sciousness is in fact the notice of the 

 mind itself; and the term isapplied to that 

 state, with which every sensorial change 

 which excites the notice of the mind is at- 

 tended. When the consciousness is con- 

 tinued, either on a particular object, or on 

 a particular succession of objects, whether 

 or not that continuance is caused by voli- 

 tion, the state of the mind is called at- 

 tention. It is by consciousness alone 

 that we have any knowledge of the 

 other powers of the mind ; and when 

 directed to their operations, the appella- 

 tion is peculiarly appropriate. When it 

 is excited by sensible changes, it is usu- 



ally called perception : consciousness re* 

 fen-ing to the operations of the mind, as 

 such ; perception to them, as produced by 

 external objects. (For an account of per- 

 ceptions, as distinct from sensations, see 

 SENSATION) We are conscious of idea* 

 and sensations ; we perceive the external 

 objects which produce impressions on 

 the external organs When the conscious- 

 ness is suspended, as it often is, during 

 sleep, &c. the ever active mechanism of 

 the mental organs proceeds; in such 

 cases, its operations sometimes excite 

 the conciousness ; otherwise we know of 

 their existence only by their effects. On 

 the other hand, consciousness necessarily 

 implies sensorial changes ; for to speak 

 of the consciousness of nothing is an ab- 

 surdity. 



I. OF THE SENSITIVE POWER. 



14. For a consideration of the leading 

 facts respecting this faculty, we beg our 

 readers to consult in this place the follow, 

 ing articles, in their order; viz. SENSA- 

 TION, SIGHT, STUELL, SOUND or HEARING, 

 TASTE, and TOUCH. In the first will be 

 found a brief account of the physical 

 organ of sensation and motion. 



II. OF THE RETENTIVE POWER. 



15. Respecting this faculty, see the ar- 

 ticle RETENTION, where will also be 

 found a few notices respecting ocular 

 spectra. 



III. OF THE ASSOCIATIVE POWER. 



16. This principle, if not the sole cause 

 of all our mental phenomena, except the 

 original production of sensorial changes 

 and tendencies to them, has some effect 

 in the origin and modification of all of 

 them. It is owing to this important prin- 

 ciple, that sensations become the signs of 

 thoughts and feelings, by which means 

 man becomes a social being; that the 

 whole mental furniture of perceptions, 

 notions, affections, passions, sentiments, 

 emotions, 8cc. is formed from the simple 

 relicts of sensation ; that man from mere 

 sensation rises to intellect ; that he be- 

 comes capable of reflection, of action. In 

 short, whatever mental operation we at- 

 tend to, except at the very earliest peri, 

 od of mental culture, we find association 

 the cause of its production, or intimately 

 concerned in it. 



17- The fact of the connection which 

 exists between many of our sensorial 

 changes has been long known ; but it has 



