PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 



with pleasure or pain. The law to which 

 we have referred may be thus stated. 

 One idea may become connected with a 

 second, by means of their mutual connec- 

 tion with a third ; and where it is not ne- 

 cessary to attend to this third or interme- 

 diate idea, the more the connection be- 

 tween the first and second is confirmed, 

 the less will the third be perceptible ; so 

 that when the association becomes com- 

 pletely fixed, the intermediate idea is 

 often lost entirely from the view of the 

 mind. The absence of the intermediate 

 idea is often so complete, that its ever 

 having 1 been present can only be disco- 

 vered by tracing the progress of the con- 

 nection between the extremes ; and in 

 certain cases where the association has 

 been long in a perfect state, the difficul- 

 ty may become so great, that we are in- 

 clined to admit an intermediate idea, on- 

 ly because we feel it in other similar 

 cases, and perhaps in the very same con- 

 nections in other individuals whose habits 

 are less fixed. This law, or mode of ope- 

 ration, of the principle which we call as- 

 sociation, meets us at almost every step 

 of our reflection on what passes within 

 us. It may be termed the law of transfer- 

 ence, and we shall state it again in ano- 

 ther form. Let A, B, and C, represent 

 three ideas, simple or compound, plea- 

 surable, painful or indifferent. If A is 

 connected with B, and B with C, A may 

 be transferred to C, and be recalled by it, 

 without B being present in the mind. 



39. This is an exceedingly important 

 and constantly operating law of associa- 

 tion : it is thus that numerous, almost in- 

 numerable, phenomena are produced, 

 which at first sight appear inexplicable 

 upon any known principles, and which 

 therefore are referred to instinct ; that is, 

 they are supposed to result necessarily 

 from the conformation of the mind, with- 

 out the operation of any acknowledged 

 faculty of the mind. Such are the 

 belief in what is called self-evident 

 truths ; the pleasures derived from ob- 

 jects which do not affect the mind by di- 

 rect sensations, disinterested affections, 

 &c. Whenever we meet with the word 

 , instinct, applied to the human mind, we 

 are to consider it simply as an appeal to 

 ignorance ; and though it seems often to 

 be held out as the solution of a difficulty, 

 it is, in fact, nothing more than saying, 

 thefeeling, or whatever else it be, springs 

 up we know not how ; we know nothing 

 of its origin, progress, or exercise. The 

 term instinct explains nothing, and 

 though it is conveniently used with re- 



spect to the minds of brutes, of which we 

 can learn nothing with certainty, yet 

 when applied to the human mind, respect- 

 ing whose operations we may often gain 

 correct ideas, it is worse than saying no- 

 thing, for it stops investigation by a pre- 

 tence of knowledge. It is true, we cannot 

 trace many links in the chain of cause and 

 effect ; but as far as the great Creator 

 has furnished us with powers, we need 

 not be afraid to employ them, while their 

 employment is conducted with judgment 

 and caution. We do not say that all 

 those feelings which we are too apt to 

 call instinctive, can in the present state 

 of our knowledge be completely analyz- 

 ed, and traced to their origin ; but while 

 so many can, so many too which in no res- 

 pect differ from those which we cannot 

 account for, except in the opportunity 

 which we have of accounting for them, 

 we have a full and fair right to say, that as 

 attention to mental science increases, 

 these difficulties will diminish, and that 

 by degrees the whole of our mental fur- 

 niture will be traced, as we can trace a 

 great part of it, to sensations, retained by 

 the retentive power, and combined and 

 variously modified by the associative 

 power. We have no objection to the 

 term natural feelings, &c. rightly explain- 

 ed ; the word is abused, and often means 

 the same as instinctive. We understand 

 by the term those feelings, &c. which in 

 all cases, where there is not something 

 peculiar in the individual, will spring up 

 in the mind, in consequence of the influ- 

 ence of generally occurring circumstan- 

 ces upon the powers with which the 

 great Former of the mind hath endowed 

 it. For instance, the parental, the filial 

 feelings, &c. are natural feelings : in all 

 cases where there is not something wrong 

 in the individual, these feelings will 

 spring up in his mind in consequence of 

 the influence of generally occurring cir- 

 cumstances upon the powers with which 

 the mind is endued. So also a great varie- 

 ty of other feelings, which, with the 

 strictest propriety, may in this sense be 

 termed natural. Some objection, how- 

 ever, lies against another word often used 

 in a similar way. Such feelings are said to 

 be implanted. If the word be understood 

 to mean nothing more than what some 

 do mean when they use it, that the feel- 

 ings, &c. spring up in the mind with the 

 same certainty as though they had made 

 a part of the original structure of the 

 mind, all is well. But if it be understood 

 to mean that these feelings do form a 

 part of the original structure, then it im- 



