PHILOSOPHY, MENTAL. 



plies the same cutting of the Gordian 

 knot, the same appeal to ignorance, which 

 is implied in the use of the word instinc- 

 tive. If, however, we can restrict its sig- 

 nification in our minds, we shall do well. 

 Let it mean no more than that the feel- 

 ings, &c. to which it is applied, are the 

 necessary results from those powers 

 which the Supreme Being has implanted 

 in us; in fact, let it have the same general 

 meaning as natural, with rather more 

 force, denoting the necessity of their aris- 

 ing from the powers which are given us, 

 and we shall not be giving way to those 

 erroneous views which we must unlearn 

 before we can acquire truth. 



40. We need not go far for instances 

 which will explain the law of transfer- 

 ence. Suppose a person acquiring ano- 

 ther language, the French, for instance; 

 he learns the meaning of a French word 

 by means of the corresponding English 

 word; by degi-ees, as the French word 

 becomes familiar to him, it is understood 

 without the English word being thought 

 of. Here the signification, that is, the 

 idea connected with the word, may be 

 called A, the English word B, and the 

 French word C ; by frequent connection 

 between A and C, by means of B, A is 

 transferred to C, the signification is trans- 

 ferred to the French word, so thatB the 

 English word is no longer wanting to 

 form the link of union. When a young 

 person has acquired some facility in con- 

 struing French, he generally reads his 

 French work in English; but when he 

 has acquired a pretty complete know- 

 ledge of the language, he reads it in 

 French; that is, he understands it without 

 the intervention of the corresponding 

 English words. Those who are conver- 

 sant with short-hand, can read it without 

 thinking of the long-hand; yet they 

 learnt this through the medium of the 

 long-hand words. Those who have long 

 learnt to read, and who have read much 

 to themselves, seldom think of the sound 

 of the words when they are reading to 

 themselves. When we are pretty fa- 

 miliar with a subject, a single glance of 

 the eye over a page of a clear printed 

 book, will convey to us the idea of its 

 contents, when perhaps not a single word 

 has particularly attracted our attention, 

 when certainly there has not been time 

 for the mind to think of the sound of the 

 words We do not recommend this 

 habit of reading to young persons; but 

 simply state a fact which is very con- 

 venient and useful to the mind, which has 

 gone through sufficient discipline of 



accuracy, &.c. Now it is obvious that 

 in almost all cases, persons learn to under- 

 stand written words through the medium 

 of spoken words. One more instance 

 and we have done with mere illustration. 

 Those who are familiar with writing 

 never think of the printed word, unless 

 any particular circumstance call it to the 

 mind. Yet there are very few instances 

 in which the written word is not connect- 

 ed with the spoken word by means of 

 the before learnt printed word. 



41. I now proceed to show the appli- 

 cation of this law, in explaining certain 

 phenomena of belief, and the origin of 

 disinterested affections. I am not now to 

 attempt the explanation of the formation 

 of the complex feeling which we call 

 belief, nor of those complex states of 

 mind which we call affections; but sup- 



Eosing them formed, to explain some 

 icts respecting them, that is, to show 

 how these facts accord with the general 

 law of association which I have been 

 stating. Belief is transferable from 

 the reasoning to the result of that 

 reasoning. Suppose a proposition de- 

 pends for its truth upon a great number 

 of other propositions; if, as we go along, 

 every step is believed to be true, and 

 every connection of one step with ano- 

 ther appears to be a just one, the feeling 

 of belief is successively transferred from 

 one step to another, till at last we come 

 to the result, the proposition which we 

 wish to prove, and the feeling will be 

 connected with this, and will remain with 

 it, when all the steps by which its truth 

 was shewn are entirely lost from the 

 view of the mind. Every one admits 

 this; and every one who has gone through 

 the process knows it to be so. There 

 are almost innumerable instances in which 

 we find the feeling of belief connected 

 with ideas, without our being able at 

 once to say, or even to say at all, how 

 we acquired the connection. In this in- 

 stance some philosophers refer to certain 

 instinctive principles, by which we are 

 necessarily led to believe, without any 

 further reason than that our mental con- 

 stitution compels it. Bvit we need not 

 resort to such hypotheses ; they do great 

 injury, by checking the researches of 

 the intellect, and in some cases, by lea- 

 ding people to suppose opinions well 

 founded, which have no further ground 

 than an almost accidental, or, at any rate, 

 unjust transfer of belief, by means of 

 what was itself, perhaps, intitled to no 

 belief. There are certain results of re- 

 flection and observation, which we call 

 experience ; and it is generally wise to 



